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I. Introduction
As U.S. businesses increasingly take advantage of globaliza-
tion trends and seek foreign markets, their profitability and
overall success depends in part on their ability to identify, assess,
minimize, and prevent the difficulties that result from criminal
liability and its attending civil consequences.
19961
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Inside counsel can tailor their work to the nature of their
international business by identifying and avoiding criminal
liability. Outside counsel and practitioners are finding that
criminal liability in international business is skyrocketing. As a
result, specializing in international business is difficult. Indeed,
international criminal liability for some clients can occur when
an executive, or even a close relative, is merely taking a vacation
or studying abroad. Further, the developments in communica-
tion, transportation, and money movement mean that a problem
in a remote part of the world affects many corporate clients or
potential clients in the United States. For example, urban
problems of the United States when combined with foreign
peasant poverty patterns of cultivating coca leaves, result in
bringing cocaine and crack to the United States for cash and
arms.' Because interdiction and law enforcement solutions
actually privatize the prevention efforts, U.S. transportation
companies, financial institutions, and even travel agents can
become targets of criminal investigations. These U.S. companies
generally do not have state of the art prevention programs to
detect such corrupt practices.
Export control and economic sanctions laws present
another clear example of the globalization impact of criminal
liability. These laws can subject multinational companies, and
their related entities and employees to criminal investigation
even when a small percentage of a commodity enters or leaves
a restricted country. Minimal activity of the United States in
such a transaction can trigger U.S. jurisdiction.2
Despite increased exposure to criminal liability, most
general corporate counsel or practitioners still view criminal
defense issues as limited to criminal defense counsel. However,
1. See, e.g., The Wages of Prohibition, THE ECONOMIST,Jan. 6, 1995, at 21 (providing
a current economic analysis of the South American drug trade and concluding that
"[e]conomic logic and text book business methods have brought victory in the drug
war to the illegal entrepreneurs of Columbia... [t]he implications are depressing for
Columbia, for the inner cities of rich countries, and for prohibitionists everywhere.");
see also Gregory Wilson, The Changing Game: The United States Evolving Supply-Side
Approach to Narcotics Trafficking, 26 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1163 (1994) (analyzing the
development of Columbia's drug cartels and the various methods of combatting the
drug trade that have ensued).
2. See infra part II.C.
[Vol. 21
4
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 21, Iss. 3 [2014], Art. 20
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol21/iss3/20
A VOIDING CRIMINAL LIABILITY
the sentencing guidelines'3 preoccupation with the need for
state of the art prevention programs preventing indictment or
minimizing punishment has forced commercial lawyers to pay
attention to criminal issues. Prevention programs also help
persuade judges and/or juries that the facts of indictments
should be construed in a positive light in reaching a verdict on
their culpability.
The globalization impact has accelerated a trend that has
been emerging for some years-the merger of international
criminal law with other areas of the law. This merger causes
criminal law and public international law to interact with and
take on characteristics of other legal areas. For instance, tax
authorities, have brought criminal lawyers from the U.S.
Department of Justice into their negotiations. In an effort to
improve the ability to assess and collect taxes of an international
nature, tax authorities have concluded Tax Information
Exchange Agreements ("TIEAs") that are a blend of tax treaties
and Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters Treaties ("MLATs").'
The merging of disciplines has resulted in some lawyers, who are
not criminal defense lawyers, advising clients on matters that
have recently become criminal in nature. Several examples
exist, and primarily occur with the movement of money.'
Section II of this paper provides a selected survey of the
U.S. criminal laws that affect international business abroad.
Section III discusses foreign criminal laws that also affect how
businesses conduct their international business. Procedural
aspects of international criminal law and related enforcement
mechanisms are discussed in Section IV. Finally, Section V
highlights recent developments in international white collar
crime and reinforces the need for practitioners in the United
3. See David McGovern et al., Project: Twenty-Third Annual Review of Criminal
Procedure: United States Supreme Court and Courts of Appeals 1992-1993, IV. Sentencing,
Sentencing Guidelines, 82 GEO. J. 1153, 1153-97 (1994). McGovern provides a detailed
analysis and survey of sentencing determinations made in federal courts through the
use of guidelines. Id. These guidelines are promulgated by the United States
Sentencing Commission, pursuant to the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No.
98-473, 98 Stat. 1987 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551-3559, 3561-3566, 3571-
3574, 3581-3586 (1994) and 28 U.S.C. §§ 991-998 (1994)).
4. See infra Part IV.
5. Some examples are money laundering prosecutions, new requirements to
conduct comprehensive due diligence procedures, bank and savings and loan
prosecutions, and penalization of transfer pricing and other international tax matters.
1996]
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States to understand and apply both the substantive and
procedural aspects of international commercial criminal law.
II. U.S. Criminal Laws That Affect Doing Business Abroad
This section provides a selective overview of some of the
legal areas in which U.S. criminal laws may affect doing
international business abroad:6 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act;
export control and technology transfer; international securities
and commodities futures; money movement offenses; tax
offenses; and environmental offenses. These topics are selected
to contrast with the issues in these same substantive areas in
foreign countries.
A. The Foreign Corrupt Practices Ace
1. Background of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
The U.S. Congress enacted the Foreign Corrupt Practices
Act ("FCPA" or "Act") in 1977 in response to the growing
perception that U.S. multinationals doing business abroad were
systematically engaging in the bribery of foreign officials.8 This
perception was supported by a Securities and Exchange
Commission ("SEC") report which revealed that over 400
corporations based in the United States, including 117 of the
Fortune 500, had paid substantial bribes in the past-totaling
hundreds of million of dollars.9
6. See generally INTERNATIONAL TRADE AVOIDING CRIMINAL RisKs (William M.
Hannay ed., 1991) [hereinafter Hannay] (analyzing foreign criminal laws that affect
doing business abroad, United States criminal laws that apply to doing business abroad,
and practical and procedural issues of international business and litigation); see alsoVED
P. NANDA & M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: A GUIDE TO U.S.
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE (1987).
7. The author is grateful for the assistance of his colleague David W. Phillips in
preparing this section.
8. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1988)); see also S. REP. NO. 114, 95th
Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4098, 4101.
9. Julia C. Bliss & Gregory J. Spak, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1988:
Clarification or Evisceration?, 20 LAw & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 441, 445 (1989); see also S. REP.
NO. 114; see generally Summary: U.S. General Accounting Office, Report to the Congress
by the Comptroller General, Impact of Foreign Corrupt Practices Act on U.S. Business:
Report to Congress (1981).
[Vol. 21
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Following the SEC report, Congress approved the FCPA
with little debate.10 The Act controls bribery in two ways: first,
it prohibits any U.S. person, real or corporate, from bribing a
foreign official;" second, it mandates record-keeping stan-
dards for publicly-held corporations registered under the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934.12
In 1988, Congress narrowed and clarified a number of
standards contained in the Act. 3 The single most important
amendment modified the standard of knowledge required for
liability under the Act.1 4 Previously, the FCPA imposed crimi-
nal and civil liability on those who made payments to third
parties "knowingly or having a reason to know"15 that those
payments would be used by the third party for purposes
prohibited under the Act. 6 Corporate officials claimed that
the "reason to know" standard created uncertainty regarding
their liability pertaining to the conduct of their foreign interme-
diaries, consultants and agents. 7 Under the 1988 amend-
ments, Congress replaced the "reason to know" standard 8 with
a clearer and narrower definition of "knowledge.""'
2. The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Today
a. Section 102: Accounting and Record Keeping Provisions
Section 102 of the Act mandates minimum accounting and
international record keeping procedures applicable to publicly-
held corporations. 2' These standards apply only to "Issuers" of
securities, which the Act defines as either (1) corporations with
10. See Bliss & Spak, supra note 6, at 445-46.
11. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1 (1988).
12. Id. § 78m(b) (2).
13. See Conference Report to Accompany H.R.3, H.R. CONF. REP. No. 576, 100th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1988).
14. See§ 2763, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982), reintroduced as S. 708, 97th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1983) (presenting the earliest revision of the "reason to know" standard).
15. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-l(a) (3), 78dd-2(a) (3) (1977).
16. Id.
17. 134 CONG. REc. S2589-90 (daily ed. Mar. 18, 1988) (statement of the California
State World Trade Commission).
18. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 576, supra note 10, at 919-20.
19. Id.; see infra notes 48-56 and accompanying text.
20. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b) (2) (1988).
1996]
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a class of securities registered under section 12 of the 1934
Act,2 1 or (2) companies required to file reports under section
15(d) of the 1934 Act.22 Thus, issuers with securities held of
record by fewer than 300 persons are exempted from the
FCPA's record-keeping requirements.
Section 102 of the Act imposes a general duty on issuers to
maintain accurate and detailed books and records. Moreover,
this section requires issuers to adopt internal auditing proce-
dures to reasonably ensure corporate supervision over the
accounting and reporting procedures of the entire corporate
organization (e.g., subsidiaries and affiliates) .23 However,
corporations complained that the 1977 Act's record-keeping
requirements were vague and produced unnecessary compliance
costs. 24  In 1988, Congress clarified several of these require-
ments to determine a standard governing liability.
The 1988 amendments more clearly defined the "reasonable
detail" standard25 imposed on companies to keep their books,
records and accounts. 26 The amendments also added language
establishing that a corporation must only obtain "reasonable
assurance" 27 of corporate supervision of its activities relating to
its internal corporate accounting controls.
2
Criminal liability under the Act was modified under the
1988 amendments to cover only those persons who "knowingly
circumvent" corporate accounting controls,29 or those who
21. Id. § 781(a). Section 12 of the 1934 Act requires registration of all securities
involved in transactions with the national securities exchange. Id.
22. See id. § 780(d). Section 15(d) of the 1934 Act imposes the duty to file
periodic corporate reports upon issuers that have filed registration statements with the
Securities Exchange Commission. Id.
23. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 102, 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b) (2) (A),
(B) (1988).
24. See, e.g., 134 CONG. REC. S2590 (daily ed. Mar. 18, 1988)(statement of the
California State World Trade Commission).
25. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b) (2) (B) (i)-(iv) (1988) (requiring that (i) all transactions be
authorized; (ii) all transactions be recorded in such a way as to comply with generally
accepted accounting principles and to maintain accountability for assets; (iii) any
access to assets be authorized; and (iv) the books and records be periodically checked
against existing assets to determine any possible discrepancies).
26. Id.
27. Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102
Stat. 1107 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2) (1988)).
28. Id.
29. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(5) (1988).
(Vol. 21
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"knowingly falsify" corporate records.3 0  This ensures that
penalties under the Act will not be imposed for "insignificant or
technical infractions" or "inadvertent conduct."
3 1
Congress also amended the FCPA to provide that an issuer
that owns fifty percent or less of a foreign or domestic subsidiary
discharges its duty under the Act,3 2 provided that the issuer
uses its influence in good faith to cause the subsidiary to comply
with the requirements of the Act.3 3 Issuers, therefore, are not
held automatically liable for the acts of their minority-owned
subsidiaries.3 4
b. Sections 103 and 104: The Antibribery Provisions
Although sections 103 and 104 of the Act apply to different
types of parties and are enforced by different governmental
agencies,35 they commonly prohibit all United States persons
from making monetary or other types of bribes to a "foreign
official" to encourage a favorable decision. 6
In order to prove a violation of sections 103 and 104, the
following elements must be established:
37 *
(a) the issuer or domestic concern has utilized a means of
interstate commerce;
38
30. Id. § 78m(b) (2) (B), (b)(5).
31. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 576, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 916, reprinted in 1988
U.S.C.CAN. 1949.
32. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b) (2) (B), (b)(6) (1988).
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. For example, section 103 prohibits bribery of foreign officials by issuers, their
officers, directors and agents. Id. § 78dd-1. Section 104 prohibits bribery of foreign
officials by all domestic concerns other than issuers. Id. § 78dd-2(a). A "domestic
concern" is defined broadly, including any individual who is a citizen, national, or
resident of the United States; and any corporation, partnership, joint association, joint
stock company, business trust, unincorporated organization, or sole proprietorship that
has its primary place of business in the United States. Id. § 78dd-2(h) (1).
36. It should be emphasized that the bribery section of the Act applies only to
conduct that seeks to influence a foreign official, political party, or candidate.
Therefore, it is not illegal under the FCPA to bribe foreign private individuals to gain
business from a foreign company.
37. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-I(a), 78dd-2(a) (1988). The FCPA includes any decision
by a foreign official to achieve new business or to continue business relations with a
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(b) corruptly;"9
(c) in furtherance of an offer, payment, promise to pay or
authorization of a payment; °
(d) of any money, offer, gift, promise to give or authorization
of the giving of anything of value;4'
(e) to a foreign official, or foreign political party or its
officials, any candidate for foreign political office, or any
third party with the knowledge that part of the money will go
to such an official, party or candidate;42
(f) with the purpose of influencing any act, or decision or to
induce the official, party or candidate to influence a foreign
government or instrumentality to affect or influence any
decision or act of the government or its instrumentality; 3
(g) in order to help the issuer or domestic concern to obtain
or to retain business.
44
Several of the above elements are expressly defined in the
Act.4  In addition, the legislative history of the 1977 Act
explains how "corruptly" should be interpreted:
The word "corruptly" is used in order to make clear that the
offer, payment, promise, or gift must be intended to induce
the recipient to misuse his official position in order to
wrongfully direct business to the payor or his client, or to
obtain preferential legislation or a favorable regulation. The
word "corruptly" connotes an evil motive or purpose, an
intent to wrongfully influence the recipient. It does not
require that the act be fully consummated, or succeed in
producing the desired outcome.46
Thus, the payment must be intended to induce the wrongful
exercise of official influence.
As indicated above, the most important revisions of the
1988 amendments to the FCPA modified the knowledge
standard for liability under the Act.47  "Knowing" is now







45. Id. §§ 78dd-l(f), 78dd-2(h).
46. S. REP. No. 114,95th Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.CAN.
4098, 4108.
47. 15 U.S.C. § 78(m) (b) (5) (1988).
(Vol. 21
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(a) awareness that the third party is engaging in prohibited
conduct, or that a prohibited circumstance exists or that a
prohibited result is substantially certain to occur;
48
(b) belief that the prohibited circumstance exists or is
substantially certain to occur;49 or
(c) awareness of a high probability that a prohibited circum-
stance exists, unless the person actually believes that the
circumstance does not exist.
50
The legislative history of the 1988 amendments shows that
the knowledge standard under the Act will be met by "conscious
disregard," "willful blindness," or even "a conscious purpose to
avoid learning the truth."51 However, mere recklessness is not
sufficient to establish liability under the Act.52
The 1988 amendments also clarified the type of behavior
that would not violate the Act. 3 For example, a payment made
to "expedite or to secure the performance of a routine govern-
mental action" does not violate the FCPA.54 This is a change
from the original 1977 Act which excluded payments to certain
foreign officials based on their status.55 The Act now exempts
the payment based on the character and purpose of the
payment itself, not the status of the foreign official receiving the
payment.
56
Payments for "routine governmental action" 7 are defined
to include only those actions "ordinarily and commonly
performed" to obtain permits or documents to qualify to do
business in the country;5s process official papers, such as visas
and work orders;59 provide police protection, mail service,
contract performance, or transit inspections;' provide tele-
48. Id. §§ 78dd-1 (f) (2) (A) (i), 78dd-2(h) (3) (A) (i).
49. Id. § 78dd-1 (f) (2) (A) (ii), 78dd-2(h) (3) (A) (ii).
50. Id. §§ 78dd-l (f) (2) (B), 78dd-2(h)(3)(B).





55. For example, clerical or ministerial government employees were exempted.
See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-l(b), 78dd-2(D)(2) (West 1981).
56. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-l(b), 78dd-2(b) (1988).
57. Id. §§ 78dd-1(b), 78dd-2(b).
58. Id. §§ 78dd-1 (f) (3) (A) (i), 78dd-2(h) (4) (A) (i).
59. Id. §§ 78dd-1 (f) (3) (A) (iii), 78dd-2 (h) (4) (A) (ii).
60. Id. §§ 78dd-1 (f) (3) (A) (iii), 78dd-2(h) (4) (A) (iii).
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phone, power or water service, cargo handling or perishable
goods protection;" or similar actions.62
In addition to the specific exemptions outlined above, there
are two affirmative defenses to charges of FCPA violations. 63
First, there is an affirmative defense if the payment or gift was
lawful under the laws of the country of the foreign official.'
However, the local law must be distinct and written; it is not a
defense to simply assert that the country lacks express anti-
bribery laws.65
The second affirmative defense covers certain expenditures
related to the execution or performance of a contract with a
foreign government,' or directly related to the promotion,
demonstration, or explanation of the product or service.67 The
establishment of an open expense account for visiting foreign
officials would likely not qualify for this exemption. On the
other hand, lobbying or other normal representations to
government officials would qualify.
3. Enforcement
The bribery sections68 of the FCPA make it illegal for any
company to bribe a foreign official to obtain or retain busi-
ness.' The Department of Justice has the jurisdiction to
enforce the bribery provisions of the FCPA.7 ° However, the few
cases that the Department of Justice has brought under the
bribery provisions have involved egregious violations of the
FCPA.7' In one set of cases, the Pemex cases, the bribery
payments were so blatant that knowledge, under either the pre-
or post-1988 standard, was not even at issue.72
61. Id. §§ 78dd-l (f) (3) (A) (iv), 78dd-2 (h) (4) (A) (iv).
62. Id. §§ 78dd-1 (f) (3) (A) (v), 78dd-2(h) (4) (A) (v).
63. Id. §§ 78dd-1(c), 78dd-2(c).
64. Id. §§ 78dd-l (c) (1), 78dd-2 (c) (1).
65. Id.
66. Id. §§ 78dd-1 (c) (2) (B), 78dd-2(c)(2)(B).
67. Id. §§ 78dd-1 (c) (2) (A), 78dd-2(c) (2) (A).
68. Id. §§ 78dd-l(a) (2), 78dd-2(a) (2).
69. Id.
70. 18 U.S.C. §§ 201-24 (1988).
71. See 1 Foreign Corrupt Practices Rep. 100.08, July 1991 (Business Laws, Inc.)
(stating that criminal charges for accounting and record-keeping violations often
accompany the bribery charges).
72. See supra text accompanying notes 15 and 69.
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The Pemex cases arose out of a conspiracy among a number
of companies to obtain or retain business with Petroleos
Mexicanos ("Pemex"), an oil company owned by the Mexican
government. The conspiracy involved kickback payments by the
conspirators to two of Pemex's officers (subdirectors of purchas-
ing and production; "the officers"). Crawford Enterprises, Inc.
("CEI") initiated the conspiracy and joined Ruston Gas Tur-
bines, Inc. ("Ruston"); a division of International Harvester
Corporation, and C.E. Miller Corporation ("Miller").7
CEI arranged to pay the Pemex subsidiary officers five
percent of all the fees the conspirators received from Pemex.
In return, the officers gave the conspirators all of Pemex's
turbine compression system business.74 The Department of
Justice brought criminal charges against the conspirators in 1982
73. Indictment, United States v. Crawford Enters., Inc., Crim. No. H-82-224 (S.D.
Tex. filed n.d.), reprinted in 2 Foreign Corrupt Practices Rep. 696.53-.55 (Business Laws,
Inc.); Offer of Proof, United States v. Ruston Gas Turbines, Inc., Crim. No. H-82-207
(S.D. Tex. filed Sept. 22, 1982), reprinted in 2 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Rep.
696.38-.39 (Business Laws, Inc.); Offer of Proof, United States v. C. E. Miller Corp.,
Crim. No. 82-788 (C.D. Cal. filed n.d.), reprinted in 2 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Rep.
696.33-35 (Business Laws, Inc.); Offer of Proof, United States v. International Harvester
Co., Crim. No. H-82-244 (S.D. Tex. filed n.d.), reprinted in 2 Foreign Corrupt Practices
Act Rep. 696.29 (Business Laws, Inc.); see also Why Pemex Can't Pay Mexico's Bills, BUS.
WK., Feb. 28, 1983, at 58, 60; Alan Riding, Pemex Inquiry Urged on Kickbacks, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 30, 1982, at section 1, page 37; Tamar Lewin, U.S. Jury Investigating Payments to
Mexicans, N.Y. TIMES, May 5, 1982, at Di.
74. Indictment, United States v. Crawford Enters., Inc., Crim. No. 82-224 (S.D.
Tex. filed n.d.), reprinted in Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Rep. 696.53-55 (Business
Laws, Inc.), CEI set and inflated all the conspirator's bids. Id. Ruston subcontracted
out to Miller, whose fees also included a five percent markup. Offer of Proof, United
States v. Ruston Gas Turbines, Inc., Crim. No. H-82-207 (S.D. Tex. filed Sept. 22, 1982),
reprinted in 2 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Rep. 696.39 (Business Laws, Inc.). The
Pemex subsidiary officers would accept the conspirator's bids and pay bribe money
back to the Pemex subsidiary officers. When Ruston's bids were accepted, the officers
would pay Miller for the bid work. In turn, Miller would pass its five percent bribe
money to CEI, which passed the money back to the Pemex subsidiary officers through
Grupo Delta. Offer of Proof, United States v. C. E. Miller Corp., Crim. No. 82-788
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for violation of the FCPA.75 Ruston, Miller, and International
Harvester, pleaded guilty and paid fines.
76
The remaining defendants pleaded nolo contendere on the
eve of trial to all of the charges in the indictment. 77  As a
result, the court fined CEI $3,450,000, its president Donald
Crawford $309,000, and other defendants $235,000.7 None of
the defendants received prison terms.79
B. Export Control and Technology Transfer
An esoteric area of international trade and administrative
law, whose violations have ensnared many unwary businesses in
75. Indictment, United States v. Crawford Enters., Crim. No. H-82-224 (S.D. Tex.
filed n.d.), reprinted in 2 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Rep. 696.53-55 (Business Laws,
Inc.); Information, United States v. Applied Process Prods. Overseas, Inc., Crim. No.
83-00004 (D.C. May 1981), reprinted in 2 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Rep. 696.61-66
(Business Laws, Inc.); Information, United States v. Ruston Gas Turbines, Inc., Crim.
No. H-82-207 (S.D. Tex. filed n.d.), reprinted in 2 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Rep.
696.38 (Business Laws, Inc.); Information, United States v. C. E. Miller Corp., Crim.
No. 82-788 (C.D. Cal. filed Sept. 1982), reprinted in 2 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
Rep. 696.33 (Business Laws, Inc.); Information, United States v. International Harvester
Co., Crim. No. 82-244 (S.D. Tex. filed n.d.), reprinted in 2 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
Rep. 696.27-.28 (Business Laws, Inc.).
76. Plea Agreement, United States v. Ruston Gas Turbines, Inc., Crim. No.
H-82-202 (S.D. Tex. filed Sept. 22, 1982), reprinted in 2 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
Rep. 696.4 (Business Laws, Inc.). Ruston paid $750,000. Id. Miller and its president
pleaded guilty to conspiracy and paid fines and court costs totaling $510,000. Id.
Information, United States v. C. E. Miller Corp., Crim. No. 82-788 (C.D. Cal. filed Sept.
1982), reprinted in 2 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Rep. 696.33 (Business Laws, Inc.).
International Harvester pleaded guilty to conspiracy and paid fines and court costs
totaling $510,000.00. Id. Information, United States v. International Harvester Co.,
Crim. No. 82-244 (S.D. Tex. filed n.d.), reprinted in 2 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
Rep. 696.27-.28. Notice of Plea Agreement and Plea Agreement, United States v.
International Harvester Co., Crim. No. 82-2444 (S.D. Tex. filed Nov. 16,1982), reprinted
in 2 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Rep. 696.31 (Business Laws, Inc.); Andy Pasztor,
Pemex Bribery Case Defendants Found Guilty, WALL ST. J., Apr. 5, 1985, at 2, col. 5. Luis
Uriarte, an employee of International Harvester, pleaded guilty to a charge of being
an accessory after the fact. See United States v. McLean, 738 F.2d 655, 657 n.3 (5th Cir.
1984). George S. McLean, another International Harvester employee, succeeded in
having many of the charges brought against him dismissed. Id. at 660. McLean was
later tried and acquitted on a charge of conspiracy. See McLean v. International
Harvester Co., 817 F.2d 1214, 1217 (5th Cir. 1987).
77. United States Dep't ofJust., Crim. Division, Fraud Sec., Litig. Release, U.S. v.
Crawford Litigation Is Finally Resolved [hereinafter "U.S. Dep't of Just. Litig. Release"],
reprinted in 2 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Rep. 696.6601 (July 31, 1985); see Pemex Case
Convictions, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 6, 1985, § 1, at 29.




William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 21, Iss. 3 [2014], Art. 20
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol21/iss3/20
A VOIDING CRIMINAL LIABILITY
criminal litigation, is export control and technology transfer.
Although these laws initially were directed against communist
countries during the Cold War, they continue to be aggressively
enforced against additional countries deemed dangerous to the
United States (e.g., Iran, Iraq, and Libya). The United States
Customs Services has aggressively conducted undercover sting
operations in the enforcement of these laws, including against
foreign persons who are both residing overseas and not
conducting business in the U.S. The differences in application
of these laws by the U.S. Department of Commerce and the
Customs Service make criminal enforcement of these laws a
potential trap for the unwary.
1. The Export Administration Act
The chief mechanism by which the U.S. Government
controls the extraterritorial supply of unclassified data and
goods is the Export Administration Act ("EAA"). s° It applies
to certain goods and various types of technical data."1 For
goods, the EAA provides that the Secretary of Commerce
publish a list of controlled goods, the Commodity Control
List. 2 The Bureau of Export Administration administers the
Commodity Control List. 3 Any good on the list cannot be
exported without first obtaining a license specifically covering a
shipment of such goods, unless a general license applies.8 4
Several general licenses apply to goods. The most common-
ly available general licenses include the following: (1) G-DEST,
which authorizes the export of particular commodities on the
Commodity Control List to some countries without a specific
license; 5 (2) GLV, which deals with exports under specified
dollar amounts;" and (3) General License GCG, which permits
exports to government agencies of specified countries.8 7  A
good that is not covered by a general license cannot be export-
80. 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2401-20 (1988).
81. Id. § 2403(b); 15 C.F.R. § 799.1(a) (1994).
82. 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2403(b), 2404(c) (1988) (also referred to as the Commerce
Control List); see 15 C.F.R § 799.1 (1994).
83. 15 C.F.R. § 799.1(a) (1994).
84. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2403(a) (1988); 15 C.F.R. § 799.1 (1994).
85. 15 C.F.R. § 771.3 (1994).
86. Id. § 771.5(a)(2). The amount does not exceed an amount specified for that
country or $500. Id.
87. Id. § 771.14(a).
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ed without a validated license from the Bureau of Export
Administration. A validated license can authorize an export of
a specific commodity to a specific entity (individual license), an
export of unlimited quantities to foreign distributors for a year
(distribution license), or a shipment of spare parts for service
purposes (service supply license).'
The EAA also applies to technical information, which
includes almost every form of technical data (e.g., a memoran-
dum, map, or software) or technical assistance which may
involve a transfer of technical data (e.g., a consulting service).89
The export of technical information may lead to difficult
conceptual problems resulting in unanticipated violations of the
EAA. These exports can even occur through disclosure to a
foreign national within the United States, such as a foreign
national's tour of a U.S. plant. ° Services, such as installation
and repair performed abroad using technical expertise, may also
constitute an "export" of data. A licensing scheme is related to
the export of technical data.9" Failure to obtain a validated
license exposes the exporter to criminal and civil penalties.
To convict a person for intentionally violating the EAA
requires proof of knowledge that the intended destination of the
controlled goods is a country where such goods are restricted.92
Penalties for willful violations for an individual include up to ten
years' imprisonment and a fine of $250,000. The penalty for
a business may be either five times the value of the exports or
one million dollars, whichever is greater.94 Any criminal
conviction can result in the forfeiture of the goods involved.95
For a lesser showing of intent an individual can receive a penalty
of up to five years imprisonment and a fine.96
88. Id. § 772.2(b).
89. Id. § 779.1 (a) (defined in § 799.1, supp. 3).
90. Id. § 779.1(b) (2) (i).
91. See, e.g., id. § 799.3.
92. United States v. Gregg, 829 F.2d 1430, 1439 (8th Cir. 1987), cert. denid, 486
U.S. 1022 (1988).
93. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2410(b)(1)(B) (1988).
94. Id. § 2410(b)(1)(A).
95. Id. § 2410(g)(1).
96. Id. § 2410(a).
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An indictment for an EAA offense is often accomanied by
charges of false statements to a government official, 9 obstruc-
tion of a government investigation, mail or wire fraud," and
racketeer influenced and corrupt organizations ("RICO")
offenses,99 such as falsified export documentation used to trick
customs officials as to the nature and value of the goods. These
acts can constitute an independent criminal violation."00
Aider-abettor liability attaches to anyone involved in a transac-
tion that eventually leads to an illegal export if that person
made a false statement as a foreseeable means of furthering the
illegal transaction.
10 1
Challenges to the propriety of having the contested good
placed on the Commodity Control List and to the procedure for
placing goods on the list have been brought. 0 2 For instance,
a defendant can assert as a defense that there was absence of
proper factual basis for including a good on the list, and that
the inclusion decision was arbitrary and capricious, and in
violation of a statutory directive. The courts have split on
97. A person who falsifies export documentation and then learns of an
investigation into his or her violation may try to cover up the offense. This may lead
to an additional and independent crime. 18 U.S.C. § 1505 (1988).
98. A charge of use of the mails or the telephone to accomplish a fraudulent
purpose may also be added. See 18 U.S.C. § 1341 & 1343 (Supp. IV 1992).
99. RICO charges normally are included when exporters have engaged in a
pattern of conduct, especially because RICO claims bring forfeiture of the criminal
enterprise assets and 20 years' imprisonment See 18 U.S.C. § 1961 et seq.
100. 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1988). The violation would be willfully concealing a
material fact or making a misleading representation in connection with any matter
within the jurisdiction of a government department or agency. Id.
101. United States v. Beck, 615 F.2d 441, 453 (7th Cir. 1980). In Beck, the Seventh
Circuit held that the evidence established that the defendant had the requisite intent
and level of participation required to be convicted as an aider and abettor of illegally
exporting arms and of filing false customs export declarations even though the
defendant did not participate in the actual preparation of the export declaration. Id.
102. These challenges have thus far failed. See, e.g., United States v. Spawr Optical
Research Inc., 864 F.2d 1467, 1473 (9th Cir. 1988) (finding that due process was not
violated when goods were deemed included on the central list and the decision was not
subject to judicial review), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 809 (1989); United States v. Gregg, 829
F.2d 1430, 1437 (8th Cir. 1987) (finding the statutes and regulations that govern the
placement of goods on the Commodity Control List are not unconstitutionally vague),
cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1022 (1988); United States v. Moller-Butcher, 560 F. Supp. 550,
552 (D. Mass. 1983) (holding the goods need not make a significant contribution to
the military potential of another country for inclusion on the control list).
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whether the decision to place an article on the Commodity
Control List is an unreviewable political decision.103
Another defense may be whether a good fits within a
prohibited category of goods, many of which are ambiguous. It
is subject to controversy whether this issue should be decided by
the court or the jury.104
Another potential defense is that an export violation was
not knowing and intentional and that the defendant did not
realize that the good in question was within a listed category on
the Commodity Control List.105 Much of the same evidence
as to scienter would apply to a determination of whether the
article in question was in fact on a proscribed list."0 6 A related
defense is that, if the commodity was a controlled commodity,
the list did not give reasonable notice of that fact, and thus
would be void-for-vagueness. Of course, criminal statutes must
provide reasonably clear guidelines as to precisely the proscribed
conduct. 10 7 Such pre-trial motions have not had much suc
103. Compare e.g., United States v. Mandel 914 F.2d 1215, 1222-23 (9th Cir. 1990)-
(holding the decision to impose export controls is not subject to judicial review) and
United States v. Martinez, 904 F.2d 601, 602 (11 th Cir. 1990) (holding no manageable
standards exist forjudicial determination of placing an item on the munitions list) and
United States v. Helmy, 712 F. Supp. 1423, 1428 (E.D. Cal. 1989) (noting a determina-
tion to include an item on the control list is conclusive) with Dart v. United States, 848
F.2d 217, 221-25 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (holdingjudicial review is appropriate to test whether
the Department of Commerce has acted in violation of the EAA and its own
regulations).
104. See Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510 (1979) (finding a conclusive presump-
tion is inconsistent with presumption of innocence and infringes on autonomy ofjury);
In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970) (holding that due process requires proof beyond
a reasonable doubt of every fact required to establish a criminal offense). But see
Kungys v. United States, 485 U.S. 759 (1988) (holding materiality of a statement is to
be decided by the court).
105. See Gregg, 829 F.2d at 1436 (ruling that the admission into evidence of the
Export Administration Act "and the voluminous regulations thereunder" supported the
defendant's argument that he was confused by them, and therefore could not have
requisite specific intent to violate the act); see also United States v. Murphy, 852 F.2d
1, 7 (1st Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1022.
106. See Murphy, 852 F.2d at 7 (holding "defendant must know that his conduct in
exporting from the United States articles proscribed by the statute is violative of the
law") (citing United States v. Lizarraga-Lizarraga, 541 F.2d 826, 828-29 (9th Cir. 1976)).
107. See, e.g., Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 573 (1974) (stating that where a
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cess 108  If the government cannot prove that the defendant
actually knew of the obligations imposed by the EAA and the
regulations promulgated thereunder and then chose to violate
them, the defendant must be acquitted. 0 9
Foreign nationals who purchase proscribed goods or data
may raise many of the above defenses as well as jurisdiction.
The government may prosecute the foreign national as an
accessory, i.e., one who aids, abets, counsels, or induces."'
These persons are sometimes prosecuted for sending packing
instructions, making shipping arrangements, or arranging
financing in a manner to avoid detection."
2. Arms Export Control Act
The Arms Export Control Act ("AECA") 2 and the
International Traffic in Arms Regulations ("ITAR")1 1 3 autho-
rize the State Department to promulgate a Munitions List
applicable to goods that are "inherently military in charac-
ter." 4 A license is required to export these articles.
The ITAR further applies to "defense services," including
design, engineering, production, processing, repair, mainte-
nance, and most significantly, the furnishing of "technical
data." 5 Regulations only apply to general technical data
directly related to defense items1 6 and to information that
advances the state of the art material on the Munitions List.1 7
The regulations exclude general scientific, engineering, and
mathematical principles, as well as information in the public
domain.
1 1 8
Penalties for willful violations of ITAR include ten years
imprisonment and a fine of up to one million dollars. 9 In
108. See United States v. Geissler, 731 F. Supp. 93, 101 (E.D.N.Y. 1990); Gregg, 829
F.2d at 1441.
109. United States v. Zevallos, 748 F. Supp 1569 (S.D. Fla. 1990).
110. 18 U.S.C. § 2(a) (1988).
111. United States v. Beck, 615 F.2d 441, 444 (7th Cir. 1980).
112. 22 U.S.C. § 2751-2796(d) (1988).
113. 22 U.S.C. § 2778 (1988).
114. 22 C.F.R. § 120.3 (1994).
115. Id. § 120.9 (1994).
116. Id. § 120.10 (1994).
117. Id. § 120.17(a) (2) (1994).
118. See Id. § 120.10(a) (5) (1994).
119. 22 U.S.C. § 2778(c) (1988).
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addition, defendants will likely be prosecuted for a series of
related defenses discussed in the previous section on the
EAA.
120
The best defense to the above is the lack of the requisite
criminal intent, since it appears that a violation of the AECA is
accepted as a specific intent crime.121 The same requirement
applies to related conspiracy offenses.1 22  The government
must prove the degree of criminal intent necessary for the
substantive offense.2 This requirement actually helps acquit
defendants, especially foreign nationals found to have made
innocent or negligent errors.1 24  To prove specific intent in
cases lacking credible evidence, the government must show
actual notice that the defendant was made aware of the export
license requirement or that he or she took evasive action
indicating knowledge of the requirement.125  Defenses to the
prosecution charges of specific intent may be proof that the
defendant had no knowledge of the illegal destination of goods
or no proof of intent through written agreement. These
defenses indicate the deal was only in the discussion phase or
within the sovereign immunity of a foreign entity.
120. See supra Part II.B.1.
121. Murphy, 852 F.2d at 6-7; see also Lizarraga-Lizarraga, 541 F.2d at 828 (knowing
and intentional violation of the munitions control act must be proven by the
government to obtain a guilty verdict); Beck, 615 F.2d at 449-50 (holding that conviction
requires proof of defendant's willful violation of the statute prohibiting the export of
illegal goods); United States v. Durrani, 835 F.2d 410, 423 (2nd Cir. 1987) (requiring
the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant had the specific
intent to send weapons out of the country).
122. United States v. Golitscheck, 808 F.2d 195, 201 (2d Cir. 1986); United States
v. Wieschenberg, 604 F.2d 326, 331 (5th Cir. 1979) (holding that to maintain "a
conviction of conspiracy, there must be proof of (1) an agreement between two or
more persons, (2) an unlawful purpose, and (3) an overt act committed by one of the
co-conspirators in furtherance of the conspiracy").
123. Wieschenberg, 604 F.2d at 332.
124. United States v. Davis, 583 F.2d 190, 193 (5th Cir. 1978) (imposing criminal
penalties for innocent or negligent error defies Congressional intent).
125. See United States v. Adames, 683 F. Supp. 255, 257-258 (S.D. Fla. 1988)
(holding that written notice on sales receipt for firearms of fact that "certain products"
may not be exported without prior approval, is not sufficient to put person on notice),
affd 878 F.2d 1374 (11th Cir. 1989); United States v. Markovic, 911 F.2d 613, 615 (11th
Cir. 1990) (holding that warnings of an illegal transaction were ineffective where
defendant did not speak English).
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3. Criminal Trade Secret Misappropriation
Trade secret misappropriation and other fiduciary breaches
provide an additional area of growing criminal liability. Theft
of the physical embodiments of proprietary information has
become the misappropriation of pure data.
Misappropriation offenses have been prosecuted under the
National Stolen Property Act,126 which prohibits the interstate
transfer of stolen property. The early cases emphasize the theft
of something tangible, even though the value was in the data,
not its physical container.1"7
C. International Securities and Commodities Futures
The SEC has recently given top enforcement priority to
prosecuting insider trading, sham transactions, and market
manipulation. 2 ' Attorneys with securities backgrounds are
increasing their numbers in key U.S. Attorneys' offices to pursue
these cases.12 9 The SEC and the U.S. Attorneys' offices have
increasingly applied their enforcement authorities extra-
territorially to gather evidence and to prosecute individuals for
conduct undertaken outside the U.S.'3°
1. Extraterritorial Jurisdiction in U.S. Securities Cases
The "internationalization of the securities markets" 31 has
facilitated transactions in and between the markets of many
countries instantaneously. U.S. courts construe federal securities
laws to cover transactions originating in the United States and
closing abroad as well as those initiated abroad and concluded
126. 18 U.S.C. § 2314 (1988).
127. United States v. Seagraves, 265 F.2d 876, 880 (3d Cir. 1959) (upholding
conviction for conspiracy to transport in interstate commerce certain geophysical maps,
knowing the maps had been stolen); United States v. Bottone, 365 F.2d 389, 393 (2d
Cir. 1966) (holding that transporting stolen pharmaceutical manufacturing processes
were illegal under the National Stolen Property Act), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 974 (1966);
United States v. Greenwald, 479 F.2d 320, 322 (6th Cir. 1973) (transporting stolen
chemical formulae within interstate commerce constituted "goods, wares or merchan-
dise" within the meaning of the National Stolen Property Act), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 854
(1973).
128. For a useful discussion of this section, see Hannay, supra note 6, § 16.
129. Id. § 16.01, 16-4.
130. Id.
131. Id. § 16.06, 16-27.
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in the United States. l"' Courts base their authority to exercise
jurisdiction on the language of the securities statutes them-
selves. 3 The federal securities laws provide broad jurisdic-
tion, based generally on securities transactions and related
activities either originating in the United States or the mails,
where interstate or foreign commerce is conducted.
134
By definition, "interstate commerce" is defined as including
"trade or commerce in securities or any transportation or
communication relating thereto ... between any foreign
country and any State, Territory, or the District of Columbia,"
according to section 2(7) of the Securities Act of 1933.135
Section 3(a)(17) of the 1934 Securities Act (1934 Act) has a
similar definition.'36 The preambles to both the 1933 and
1934 Acts provide that they are intended to apply to "interstate
and foreign commerce."3 y
U.S. courts will exercise subject matter jurisdiction when
notable actions or the effect of those actions in the United
States comes to light under U.S. securities laws. The courts tend
to exercise their jurisdiction more frequently in securities fraud
cases than in those involving regulatory matters.38 A limiting
factor in this seemingly broad jurisdiction under the federal
securities laws is the willingness of other states to abide by or
with the courts' attempts to exercise jurisdiction in these
cases. 1
39
2. Applicable U.S. Statutes
a. Insider Trading
Under section 10(b) of the 1934 Act' 40 it is unlawful to
use or employ any manipulative or deceptive device or scheme
against SEC regulations in connection with the purchase or sale
of any security.'4 ' Section 32(a) of the 1934 Act criminalizes
132. Id.
133. Hannay, supra note 6 § 16.06, at 16-27.
134. Id.
135. 15 U.S.C. § 77b(7) (1988).
136. 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(17) (1988).
137. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd (1982); 15 U.S.C. § 80a-7(d) (1982).
138. See HANNAY supra note 6 § 16.06, at 16-28.
139. Id.
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willful violations punishing them by fine or imprisonment of up
to five years.
142
SEC Rule 10b-5 is often applied to insider trading cases.
The SEC also uses Rule 14e-3, an insider trading rule applying
specifically to tender offers.14
The Insider Trading Sanctions Act authorizes the SEC to
obtain civil penalties against any person trading in securities
while possessing material, nonpublic information in addition to
penalties against any person who aids and abets another by
communicating that information. The civil penalty can be up
to "three times the profit gained or loss avoided" as a result of
the unlawful purchase or sale.1 "
b. Disclosures and Market Manipulation
Various laws require that exchanges and broker-dealers
keep records to determine the "terms and conditions of [each]
order."145 Additional record-keeping requirements apply to
publicly-owned U.S. corporations. 146
Under Section 9 of the 1934 Act, manipulation of securities
markets by activities such as "churning"147 is forbidden.1"
Manipulation of market prices for securities may also result in
violation of section 17(a) of the securities Act of 1933, section
10(b) of the 1934 Act, SEC Rule 10b-5, and other securities
laws.
149
142. Id. § 78ff(c) (2) (B).
143. United States v. Chestman, 1992 WL 196792 No. 88 Cr. 455 (S.D. N.Y. Aug.
31, 1992) (prosecuting criminal insider trading and perjury charges resulting from the
purchase of Waldbaum Inc. by A&P using Rule 13e-3, and the mail fraud and perjury
statutes).
144. 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d) (2) (A) (Supp. III 1985).
145. 17 C.F.R. § 240.17a-3(6) (1994).
146. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b) (2) (1988).
147. "Churning" occurs when a broker, exercising control over the volume and
frequency of trades, abuses his customer's confidence for personal gain by initiating
transactions that are excessive in view of the character of account and the customer's
objectives as expressed to the broker. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 242 (6th ed. 1990).
148. 15 U.S.C. § 78i (1988).
149. See SEC v. Resch-Cassin &Co., 362 F. Supp. 964, 968 (S.D. N.Y. 1973) (holding
that manipulative activities expressly prohibited by § 9(a) (2) of the Exchange Act with
respect to a listed security are also violations of§ 17(a) of the Securities Act proscribing
fraudulent interstate transaction and § 10(b) of the Exchange Act proscribing
manipulative and deceptive devices in interstate commerce when the same activities are
conducted with respect to an over-the-counter security).
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The federal and wire fraud statutes can also be applied to
international securities transactions that are performed with a
fraudulent intent.
150
c. Other Federal Criminal Securities Laws
The federal fraud statute is used to punish false statements
made in filings required by the SEC. 151 The statute has been
used in a variety of well known cases, such as the prosecution of
Paul Bilerian and Michael Milken.'52
The federal criminal conspiracy statute is also used to
prosecute insider trading or other securities frauds that have a
direct impact on the federal government.
53
The Criminal Victims Rights Statute allows a court to
impose, in addition to any other penalty authorized by law, a
requirement to make restitution under certain circumstanc-
es.1
54
d. Authority to Assist in Foreign Investigations
In recent years Congress has enacted laws granting enlarged
enforcement powers to the SEC. The Insider Trading and
Securities Enforcement Act of 1988 ("ITSEA")' 55 enlarges
section 21(a) of the Securities Exchange Act 5 ' by permitting
the SEC to help foreign securities authorities determine whether
foreign securities laws have been violated, even if violations of
the U.S. securities have not occurred.
3. Investigating and Prosecuting Securities Violations
International securities enforcement requires that the SEC
may have to investigate operations of the parent company that
may be located entirely abroad. The money may also be located
outside the United States. Hence, the SEC may have unique
150. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343 (1988).
151. Id. § 1001.
152. See United States v. Di Fonzo, 603 F.2d 1260 (7th Cir. 1979); United States v.
Clark, No. 87 Cr. 49, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 99,378 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 3, 1987).
153. 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1988).
154. Id. §§ 3663, 3664, 3681, 3682 (1988 & Supp. IV 1993).
155. Pub. L. No. 100-704 (1988). Insider Trading and Securities Enforcement Act
of 1988, Pub. L. No. 900-704.
156. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-1 (1988).
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problems both in gathering evidence to prove the fraud as well
as recovering the money from a foreign jurisdiction.
Initially, the SEC tries to obtain information through the
voluntary cooperation of the parties. Foreign blocking and
secrecy statutes may prevent such cooperation. 57
The SEC may issue subpoenas compelling the production
of documents and testimony. The SEC's authority to subpoena
witnesses from anywhere in the United States has been con-
strued as a broad and flexible authorization to compel the
production from anywhere in the world so long as service has
been properly effected in the United States.15
In addition to being able to utilize bilateral and multilateral
criminal and related agreements, the SEC has concluded
Memoranda of Understanding ("MOU") with its counterparts,
such as Switzerland, 159  Canada,"6  the U.K-, 6  Brazil, 62
Japan,1 63 and Canadian provinces. These MOU enable the
SEC and their counterparts to directly obtain assistance as well
as to freeze assets quickly.
D. Money Movement Offenses
An attorney or professional who does not pay attention to
legal considerations concerning the movement of money,
especially internationally, may find a client or even himself or
herself with legal and criminal difficulties. Several U.S. laws
should be considered. Section IV of this article discusses
prevention strategies for these offenses. When U.S. persons or
157. See, e.g., Securities Exchange Comm'n v. Banca Delta Suizzera Italiana, 92
F.R.D. 111, 113 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (stating that the SEC, as part of its initial investigation,
sought voluntary disclosure of the identity of certain key bank employees; no such
disclosure was forthcoming, and the SEC proceeded more formally).
158. Id. at 117-19.
159. See Memorandum of Understanding to Establish Mutually Acceptable Means
for Improving International Law Enforcement Cooperation in the Field of Insider
Trading, Aug. 31, 1982, U.S.-Switz., 22 I.L.M. 1.
160. Treaty on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters, Mar. 18, 1985, U.S.-
Canada, 24 I.L.M. 1092.
161. Memorandum of Understanding on Exchange of Information in Matters
Relating to Securities and Futures, Sept. 23, 1986, U.S.-U.K., 25 I.L.M. 1431.
162. Memorandum of Understanding between the United States Securities and
Exchange Commission and the Comissao de Valores Mobiliaros (Brazil), July 1, 1988,
N.Y.L.J. June 21, 1990, at 5.
163. Memorandum of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission and the
Securities Bureau of the Japanese Ministry of Finance on the Sharing of Information,
May 23, 1986, U.S.-Japan, 25 I.L.M. 1429.
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businesses make financial transactions that are for and/or
connected to illegal transactions, a related number of criminal
laws may be violated. These and other laws should be consid-
ered as a check list when counsel is requested to advise on
payments to officials to obtain contracts, preparation of financial
statements to obtain loans, tax planning, including structuring
offshore asset protection trusts, and responding to potentially
irregular or suspicious transactions."M
1. Money Laundering
The federal money laundering statutes, sections 1956 and
1957 of chapter 18 of the United States Code, together define
four separate criminal offenses, many of which incorporate
several alternative scienter requirements.
a. Financial Transaction Offenses: 18 U.S. c. Section
1956(a)(1)
A "financial transaction" offense is committed whenever a
person (1) engages in a "financial transaction"" ; (2) involving
property that he or she knows represents the proceeds of some
form, though not necessarily which form, of felonious criminal
activity under state or federal (or after November 29, 1990,
foreign) law166; (3) where the property in fact, represents the
proceeds of at least one of the many "specified unlawful
activities" defined in the statute16 7 ; and (4) the person engages
in the transaction with either:
(i) the intent of promoting the carrying on of "specified
unlawful activity:"
(ii) the intent to engage in conduct constituting tax
evasion or tax fraud;
(iii) knowledge that the purpose of the transaction, in whole
or in part, is either
(a) to conceal or disguise the nature, the location,
the source, the ownership, or the control of
the proceeds of "specified unlawful activity"; or
164. For a discussion of U.S. anti-money laundering laws and policy, see Bruce
Zagaris, Dollar Diplomacy: International Enforcement of Money Movement and Related
Matters-a United States Perspective, 22 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECONOMICS 465 (1989).
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(b) to avoid a transaction reporting requirement
under State or Federal law.' 6
b. International Transportation Offenses: 18 U.S.C.
Section 1956(a)(2)
An "international transportation" offense occurs whenever
a person transports, transmits, or transfers-or attempts to
transport, transmit, or transfer-funds or "monetary instru-
ments" into or out of the U.S. with either
(i) the intent of promoting the carrying on of
"specified unlawful activity;"
(ii) knowledge that the funds or monetary instru-
ments involved in the transportation represent
the proceeds of some form of unlawful activity
and that the purpose of the transportation,
transmission or transfer, in whole or in part, is
either (a) to conceal or disguise the nature, the
location, the source, the ownership, or the
control of the proceeds of specified unlawful
activity; or (b) to avoid a transaction reporting
requirement under State or Federal law.169
c. "Sting" Offenses: 18 U.S. C. Section 1956(a)(3)
A "sting" offense occurs whenever a person (1) engages in
a "financial transaction"; (2) involving property that is represent-
ed to be the proceeds of specified unlawful activity, or property
used to conduct or facilitate specified unlawful activity, by either
(a) a law enforcement officer or (b) another person acting at
the direction of, or with the approval of, a Federal official
authorized to investigate or prosecute violations of Section 1956;
(3) with the intent of either (a) promoting the carrying on of
"specified unlawful activity"; (b) concealing or disguising the
nature, the location, the source, the ownership, or the control
of the proceeds of specified unlawful activity; or (c) avoiding a
transaction reporting requirement under State or Federal
law.
170
168. Id. (emphasis added).
169. 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a) (2) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
170. Id. § 1956(a) (3).
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d. Monetary Transaction Offenses: 18 U.S.C. Section 1957
A "monetary transaction" offense occurs when a person
takes, or attempts to take, funds or a monetary instrument of a
value in excess of $10,000, which he or she knows constitutes or
is derived from a criminal offense and which, in fact, is derived
from "specified unlawful activity," and either deposits, withdraws,
transfers, or exchanges the funds or monetary instrument by,
through, or to a financial institution so as to affect interstate or
foreign commerce.
71
e. Foreign Money Laundering Laws
As discussed below, many national governments have now
criminalized money laundering and imposed the requirements
of "know your customer," and "identifying and reporting to the
government suspicious transactions." Most of the laws apply
extraterritorially.
2. Asset Concealment from FDIC, RTC, Conservator, or
Liquidating Agent
A person who knowingly conceals or endeavors to conceal
an asset or property from the FDIC, acting as conservator or
receiver with respect to any asset acquired or liability assumed
by the FDIC, the RTC, any conservator or liquidating agent, or
a person who corruptly places or endeavors to place an asset




A person who knowingly and fraudulently conceals from a
custodian, trustee, marshal, or other officer of the court charged
with the control or custody of property, or from creditors in any
bankruptcy case under Title 11 of the United States Code, or
after filing the case, knowingly and fraudulently withholds,
conceals, destroys, mutilates, falsifies, or makes a false entry in
any recorded information relating to the property or financial
affairs of a debtor is guilty of bankruptcy fraud and related
171. Id. § 1957.
172. 18 U.S.C. § 1032 (Supp. IV 1992).
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offenses. 7 ' This crime may be a predicate for RICO,174 and
can be the basis for authorizing the interception of wire or oral
communications. 1
75
4. Fraud on Loan and Credit Applications
A person who knowingly makes a false statement or report,
or willfully overvalues any land, property, or security, for the
purpose of influencing the action of a federally insured financial
institution on any loan or related application is guilty of a
felony.176  This can occur when a person makes intentional
misrepresentations, negligent misrepresentations, or makes a
false statement without reasonable ground for believing its
veracity; and concealment or suppression or a failure to disclose
facts that the speaker has a duty to disclose. A false claim of
ownership is a false statement, not an overvaluation. 177 The
impact of the statement is irrelevant. Hence, the institution
need not actually rely on the statement for a violation to
exist.
78
5. Mail Fraud and Wire Fraud: 18 U.S.C. Sections 1341 and
1343
The Crime and Control Act of 1990 increased the maxi-
mum penalty for mail and wire fraud to 30 years imprisonment
and/or a $1,000,000 fine. 79 A mail or wire fraud occurs when
(1) the defendant forms a scheme or artifice with intent to
defraud; (2) the defendant uses or causes use of the mails or
wires; and (3) the use of mails or wires is in furtherance of a
fraudulent scheme.' ° Prosecutors frequently charge mail or
173. 18 U.S.C. §§ 151-55, 3057, 3284 (1988 & Supp. HI 1991).
174. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)(D) (Supp. IV 1992).
175. 18 U.S.C. § 2516(1)(e) (1988).
176. 18 U.S.C. § 1014 (Supp. IV 1992).
177. United States v. Davis, 730 F.2d 669, 673 (11th Cir. 1984) (holding that "only
where a declarant assesses an inflated value to property that he actually owns can he
be guilty of overvaluation").
178. United States v. Bowman, 783 F.2d 1192, 1199 (5th Cir. 1986) (stating that "it
is settled law that a section 1014 offense is 'a crime of subjective intent that requires
neither reliance by lending institution nor an actual defrauding for its commission'").
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wire fraud as an alternative to offenses such as tax fraud, money
laundering, bribery, and international trade crimes.
6 Reporting Crimes
Non-compliance with various reporting requirements will
result in the commission of a variety of offenses. For instance,
the failure of a professional or commercial business to report
the receipt of $10,000 in cash violates chapter 26 United States
Code Section 60501. Rendering assistance in structuring
transactions for the purpose of evading any reporting require-
ment under the Bank Secrecy Act is also an offense.18 1  The
failure to report domestic coin and currency transactions
exceeding $10,000 on Form 4789, Currency Transaction Report
("CTR") or international transportation of currency on Form
4890, Currency and Monetary Information Report ("CMIR"),
required for currency in excess of $10,000 brought into or taken
out of the country, may constitute money laundering or
structuring. 182
As a preventative measure from the other perspective,
professional employees working for banks, financial institutions,
and other covered entities, must obtain sufficient information to
"know their customer" and identify and report suspicious
transactions or risk criminal penalties. 8
Various reporting requirements apply to foreign ownership
of U.S. entities and properties. Examples are investments in
U.S. agricultural land or U.S. investments in general, including
acquisitions of U.S. companies. Reporting is also required for
use by U.S. residents of foreign trusts and the interests of U.S.
persons in foreign banks and securities accounts.
184
7. Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement
Act of 1989 ("FIRREA ")
If the defendant, acting with intent to defraud a bank, as
statutorily defined, makes false entries, reports, or statements, he
181. 31 U.S.C. § 5324 (Supp. V 1993).
182. See 31 U.S.C. § 5316 (1988), § 5324 (Supp. V 1993).
183. See 31 U.S.C. § 5322 (1988 & Supp. IV 1993); 12 C.F.R. §21.11 (1994); 31
C.F.R. § 103.49(b) (c) (1994).
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can be found guilty of a crime under chapter 18 United States
Code sections 1001, 1005, and 1006.185
8. Complicity Statutes: 18 US.C. Sections 2 and 371
a. Aiding and Abetting: 18 U.S.C. Section 2
To convict a defendant of aiding and abetting, the govern-
ment must prove that the defendant "was associated with the
criminal venture, participated in it as something he wished to
bring about, and sought by his action to make it succeed."
186
Examples of aiding and abetting are cases concerning misappli-
cation of funds cases. 87 Aiding and abetting has also ap-
peared in cases concerning false statements'88 and false
entries.
189
185. Under 18 U.S.C. § 1001, criminal penalties are imposed upon one who makes
statements that are (1) false, (2) material, (3) made knowingly and willfully, and (4)
made in a matter within the jurisdiction of any department or agency of Untied States.
18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1988). A violator of § 1001 "shall be fined not more than $10,000
or imprisoned not more than five years, or both." Id.
18 U.S.C. § 1005 states that an officer, director, agent, or employee of a bank
cannot (1) issue or put any note of that bank into circulation without authority, (2)
make false entry in any book, report, or statement of the bank with intent to injure or
defraud the banking organization, or (3) deceive a person of the banking or regulatory
organization. 18 U.S.C. § 1005 (Supp. IV 1992). Violators will be fined not more than
$1,000,000 or imprisoned not more than 30 years, or both. Id.
As provided in 18 U.S.C. § 1006, an officer, agent, or employee of a financial
institution cannot make any false entry in any book, report, or statement of that
institution, with the intent to defraud or deceive either the institution or an individual
of the institution. 18 U.S.C. § 1006 (Supp. IV 1992). The penalty for violation is a fine
not more than $1,000,000 or imprisonment of up to 20 years, or both. Id.
186. United States v. Payne, 750 F.2d 844, 860 (11th Cir. 1985) (quoting United
States v. Hewitt, 663 F.2d 1381, 1385 (11th Cir. 1981)).
187. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 656 (Supp. IV 1992) (describing crimes of theft,
embezzlement, or misapplication by bank officer or employee); Id. § 657 (Supp. IV
1992) (describing misapplication of funds in lending, credit, and insurance institu-
tions); United States v. Mouton, 617 F.2d 1379, 1385-86 (9th Cir. 1980) (finding that
"a violation will occur if the misapplied funds are for the use of any third person."),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 860 (1980).
188. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1988); United States v. Austin, 585 F.2d 1271, 1278
(5th Cir. 1978) (holding "there was sufficient evidence for a jury to find beyond a
reasonable doubt that [defendant] aided and abetted the commission of [a] Section
1001 ... offense .... ").
189. See, e.g., United States v. Payne, 750 F.2d 844,849 (1 1th Cir. 1985) (concerning
false entries to federal credit institutions under 18 U.S.C. § 1006).
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b. Conspiracy: 18 U.S.C. Section 371
A conspiracy occurs when there is an agreement by two or
more persons, to commit an offense against or defraud the
United States, with knowledge of the existence of the conspiracy,
with intentional and actual participation in a conspiracy, and
one of the conspirators makes an overt act in furtherance of the
agreement.' 90
9. Forfeiture
Draconian civil and criminal forfeiture provisions apply to
most of the above-mentioned money movement offenses. 91
Forfeiture of the instrumentalities and proceeds of crime has
become a primary goal of prosecutors in the United States.
Foreign law enforcement authorities are emulating the prac-
tice.192 As a result, international asset forfeiture is the main
subject of treaties, major pieces of litigation, and an important
sub-area of international criminal law.' 93
E. Criminal and Quasi-Ciminal Tax Offenses
The protection of assets abroad, when coupled with the
non-payment and/or non-declaration, or misdeclaration of taxes,
may constitute tax crimes.'9 4 Criminal code provisions for the
same conduct may also apply under Title 18 of the United States
Code. The code provisions include those for conspiracy,
95
false statements to government agencies,"' and mailfraud. 197
190. See 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1988).
191. See Id. § 981 (1988) (civil forfeiture); Id. § 982 (1988) (criminal forfeiture).
192. See American Bar Association Central and East European Law Initiative, Money
Laundering: A Concept Prepared for the Government of Bulgaria, 28 INT'L LAW 835, 859-62
(1964) (discussing the application of asset forfeiture to money laundering and other
crimes).
193. Id. at 860-61; see also infra Part WY.
194. See26 U.S.C. § 7201 (1988) (discussing evading tax liability); Id. § 7203 (Supp.
V 1993) (describing consequences of failing to file a tax return, supply information or
pay tax); Id. § 7206(1) (1988) (filing false documents, including returns); 26 U.S.C.
§ 7206(2) (aiding or assisting in the preparation of a false return); Id. § 7207 (falsifying
documents as to any material matter).
195. See 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1988).
196. SeeId. § 1001 (1988).
197. Seeld. § 1341 (1988).
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A number of federal programs exist to target certain types
of transactions as well as transactions with certain countries and
vehicles. Various inter-agency investigations and computer
programs can assist in investigations and prosecutions.
198
Moreover, the United States has raised revenue by targeting
multinational enterprises that are perceived as not paying their
fair share of taxes. This perception is based on the belief that
these enterprises either shift profits to related enterprises in low
tax countries or arbitrarily shift the costs of international
operations to United -States enterprises, thereby reducing net
income and taxes owed the United States. As a result of the
decrease in taxes owed to the United States, a series of laws and
regulations in the transfer pricing area evolved."' 9
These laws and regulations have dramatically increased the
amount of recordkeeping and reporting required of multina-
tional enterprises.2" These new requirements are accompa-
nied by a major rise of severe economic penalties and loss of
procedural rights for taxpayers who do not comply." 1 Simul-
taneously, the Internal Revenue Service substantially improved
its procedural rights. Consequently, tax authorities are able to
demand information, extend the statute of limitations, prevent
198. An example of such a computer program is the Treasury Enforcement Compli-
ance System. ("TECS"). See generally Bruce Zagaris & David R. Stepp, Criminal and Quasi-
Criminal Customs Enforcement Among the U.S., Canada and Mexico, 2 IND. INT'L & COMP.
L. REV. 337 (1992) (discussing "TECS").
199. The United States has quickly and dramatically been imposing penalties on
multinational enterprises in transfer pricing cases. The Internal Revenue Code
describes transfer pricing as follows:
[T]he Secretary may distribute, apportion, or allocate gross income,
deductions, credits, or allowances between or among such organizations,
trades, or businesses, if he determines that such distribution, apportionment,
or allocation is necessary in order to prevent evasion of taxes or clearly to
reflect the income of any such organizations, trades, or businesses.
I.R.C. § 482. All citations to the I.R.C. are to the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as
amended.
200. For example, the IRS requires maintenance of very detailed records on how
transfer pricing is figured contemporaneous with the filing of income tax returns. See
I.RC. §§ 6038A, 6038C (requiring information with respect to certain foreign-owned
corporations and foreign corporations engaged in U.S. business); see also id. § 6038A(b)
(detailing information the secretary may prescribe by regulation). The appointment
of agents is also required in the U.S. where ones do not exist already, to allow
multinational enterprises to be served summons. Id. § 6038A(c).
201. The Internal Revenue Code imposes penalties of $10,000 for each year in
which the reporting corporation fails to maintain information and records as required
by § 6038A(a)(b). Id. § 6038A(d).
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the introduction of foreign documents not immediately available
to them during an examination, 2  and completely disregard
records where the taxpayer has not timely furnished such
information.0 3
In addition, U.S. tax authorities have concluded tax
information exchange and related mutual assistance agreements
with their counterparts to provide improved means for tax
agents to obtain and verify information and documents from
multinationals directly from their foreign counterparts. °4
F Environmental Offenses
The proliferation of international environmental agree-
ments and United States domestic legislation has been spurred
by a growing awareness of the importance of enforcing environ-
mental standards to protect our quality of life. The media
attention to environmental matters, and overall political
importance, especially in the Clinton Administration, has
brought transnational environmental offenses to a high level of
attention. For example, significant attention has been given to
international hazardous waste disposal and trade which spawns
from the destruction of endangered species.
1. The Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary
Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal
The Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary
Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal regulates
the movement of hazardous wastes across international bor-
ders.20 5 It was drafted under United Nations sponsorship and
signed on March 22, 1989, by more than 40 countries, including
202. See id. § 982(a). However, if the taxpayer establishes a reasonable cause for the
failure to provide the documentation requested, the documents may be introduced.
Id. § 982(b).
203. See id. §§ 6038A(e), 6038C(d) (stating that the treatment of such transaction
is within the discretion of the secretary).
204. See infra Part IVA
205. Global Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous
Waste, U.N. Environment Programme (Agenda Item 3), UNEP Doc. UNEP/IG.80/3
(1989), reprinted in 28 IL.M. 657 (1989); United Nations Environment Programme Conference
of Plenipotentiaries on the Global Convention on the Control of Transbounday Movements of
Hazardous Wastes: Final Act and Text of Basel Convention, U.N. Environment Programme,
Agenda Item 3, U.N.E.P. Doc. 1G. 80/3 (1989), reprinted in 28 I.L.M. 649, 657 (1989).
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the U.S.20 6 On August 11, 1992, the U.S. Senate ratified the
Basel Convention. °7 The Convention covers wastes enumerat-
ed in annexes to the Convention, as well as wastes defined as
hazardous in the domestic legislation of contracting countries.
It applies to movements of hazardous wastes to, or through,
participating nations. °8
Under the Convention, signatory countries can altogether
forbid the import of, or transit through, of hazardous wastes,
specific wastes, or shipments. 2°9  Other countries may not
export wastes to those countries that have neither specifically
prohibited nor expressly consented to the import of that
waste.2 10  No nation may export waste to a nation, particularly
a developing nation, that the exporting nation believes will not
manage the waste in an environmentally sound manner, nor to
any nation that is not a party to the Convention. 211 Before a
country may export hazardous waste, it must take steps to
minimize the amount of hazardous waste available for ex-
port.212  Although the Convention states that parties to the
agreement should allow the transboundary shipment of hazard-
ous wastes only when the exporting country does not have the
technical capacity and necessary facilities to dispose of the
hazardous waste, it will permit such movement of waste if it is in
accordance with other criteria to be decided by the parties.
213
The Convention provides specific procedures to be followed
before hazardous wastes may be transported across national
borders. Any transboundary movement of hazardous wastes not
in conformity with the provisions of the Convention is defined
as illegal.21 '4  The state of export is responsible for ensuring
that illegally-transported hazardous wastes are returned to that
206. Id.
207. United Nations Environment Program Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Global
Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes: Final Act and
Text of the Easel Convention, Mar. 22, 1989, 28 I.L.M. 649 (1989) [hereinafter Basel
Convention].
208. Id. arts. I, II (providing the scope & definitions of terms utilized for the
purpose of the convention).
209. Id. art. IV, 1.
210. Id.
211. Id. art. IV5, 9.
212. Id. art. IV, 2. For example, countries must ensure the availability of adequate
waste disposal facilities. Id. art. IV, 2(b).
213. Id. art. IV, 9.
214. Id. art. IX, 1.
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state or are disposed of in accordance with the provisions of the
Convention.215
While the Convention itself has no enforcement provisions,
it requires all signatories to implement domestic legislation
designed to prevent and punish illegal hazardous waste traffic
through both civil and criminal enforcement.
216
The Basel Convention took effect in 1992 following
ratification by 36 signatory countries. 2 17  On December 2,
1992, experts from signatory countries of the Basel Convention
approved a draft law on the transport of hazardous waste from
one country to another which will serve as a model for each
signatory country to enact as law.
2 18
In addition to the Basel Convention, the United States has
bilateral conventions with both Mexico and Canada concerning
the transboundary shipment of wastes.1 9
The United States regulates the import and export of
hazardous substances under a variety of domestic environmental
statutes. Chief among these is the Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act ("RCRA"), which only regulates the export of
hazardous wastes. 22' RCRA section 3017, 42 U.S.C. section
6938, added by Congress in 1984, prohibits the export of
hazardous waste to foreign countries unless notice was given to
and consent obtained from the receiving country. Violations of
this provision may lead to civil or criminal penalties.221
215. Id. art. IX, 2.
216. Id. art. IV, 4.
217. For background, see Draft Model Law to Implement Basel Hazardous Waste
Transportation Convention Is Approved, 8 INT'L ENFORCEMENT L. REP. 481 (1992).
218. Id.
219. For earlier background of the Basel Convention and international environmen-
tal criminal law generally, see Joseph G. Block et al., International Environmental Criminal
Law: Cross-Border Problems and Beyond, 8 INT'L ENFORCEMENT L. REP. 27 (1992).
220. 42 U.S.C. § 6901 (1988).
221. Id. § 6928(d), (g). Other environmental statutes have enforcement provisions
concerning the illegal export or import of toxic substances. Section 5 of the Toxic
Substances Control Act, for instance, regulates the import of toxic substances. 15
U.S.C. § 2604 (1988). Section 17(a) of the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and
Rodenticide Act prohibits the improper labelling of pesticides for export. 7 U.S.C.
§ 1360(a) (1988). The Rule to Protect the Stratospheric Ozone, promulgated under
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The first major criminal enforcement action against
exporters of hazardous waste involved the Colbert brothers. 2'
In the early and mid 1980s, Jack and Charles Colbert amassed
significant volumes of toxic chemicals which they stored in
dozens of warehouses throughout the United States.22 They
would then export these hazardous wastes to developing nations
as virgin chemical products. In 1986, a federal court in New
York sentenced the two brothers each to thirteen years in jail for
fraudulent business practices. The Colberts were stopped not by
enforcement of environmental statutes, but by laws against false
labeling of exported chemicals.
24
The federal government has used RCRA's criminal provi-
sions to prosecute persons illegally exporting and importing
hazardous wastes. In United States v. Franco,225 one of two
defendants pleaded guilty, on May 23, 1991, to charges of
conspiracy, illegal export of hazardous waste to a foreign
country, and illegal transportation of hazardous waste. 2 6
In 1991, American and Canadian authorities collaborated
to investigate an alleged large-scale scheme centered in western
New York, which may have involved mixing of toxic PCBs into
waste oil sold on both sides of the border.227  The Buffalo
United States Attorney, Dennis C. Vacco, stated that the
investigation involved "a company with a local presence and a
national presence."22 ' The investigation was characterized as
having potential ramifications beyond the U.S.- Ontario border,
and involving the cocktailing of hazardous waste into oil.229
While the Buffalo investigation indicates the desire American
officials have to eliminate illegal transboundary waste transport,
the investigation still faces substantial obstacles. In a recent
GAO report, one high ranking United States environmental
222. Andrew Porterfield & David Weir, The Export of U.S. Toxic Wastes, THE NATION,
Oct. 3, 1987, at 325, 342.
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. CR. 90-352-TJH (S.D. Cal. 1991).
226. Letter from Janet Sherman, Attorney at Law, Victor Sherman Law Office, to
John Potter, Assistant U.S. Attorney (May 23, 1991) (on file with the clerk of the
United States District Court, Central District of California).
227. Jerry Zrsmski, Waste Oil May be Tainted with PCBs - U.S. Canada Probing
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enforcement official described the hunt for illegal hazardous




In United States v. Fisher-Price, Inc., the federal government
conducted its first criminal prosecution and obtained its first
guilty plea for transportation of hazardous waste from another
country into the United States. Until a load was stopped by a
United States Customs inspector, Fisher-Price transported seven
tons of lead contaminated solder waste without a manifest from
its circuit board manufacturing facility in Tijuana to its facility
in California.2"' After a guilty plea on September 12, 1991,
the company was sentenced to a $25,000 fine and agreed to
make $1,000 restitution to U.S. Customs.
2 32
The EPA, on September 26, 1991, took administrative and
civil action against 23 facilities for violating environmental laws
concerning the illegal import or export of hazardous waste or
chemicals. Under this "cluster" enforcement action, the EPA
sought $9.8 million in administrative penalties and the Depart-
ment of Justice filed civil actions in two cases.2 33  Sixteen of
the administrative cases were brought under RCRA, three were
brought under the import provisions of the Toxic Substances
Control Act ("TSCA"), and two of the cases were brought under
the export provisions of FIFRA. The two civil actions concerned
violations of the import regulations of the Clean Air Act
concerning ozone-depleting chemicals. Eight cases concerned
shipments of hazardous waste into Mexico and seven cases
involved shipments of hazardous waste to or from Canada.3 4
III. Foreign Criminal laws That Affect Doing Business
Abroad
U.S. businesses that conduct operations internationally must
concern themselves with foreign laws that apply to their
230. Blending of Hazardous Waste with Fuel Products: Testimony Before the Subcomm. on
Environment, Energy and Natural Resources of the House of Representatives Comm. on
Government Operations, 102nd Cong., 1st Sess. (1991) (statement of Houston Fuller,
Assistant Director, Energy and Environmental Crime, Office of Special Investigations).
231. United States v. Fisher-Price, Inc., No. 91-0812B (S.D. Cal. 1991).
232. United States v. Fisher-Price, Inc., No. 91-0812B (S.D. Cal. 1991), Plea Agree-
ment at 2-3.
233. Wendy Butler, EPA Enforcement Action Targets Illegal Export/Import of Waste,
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operations in the context of the legal and business culture. To
properly identify, understand, and inform businesses of the true
implications of these foreign laws requires a knowledge of
comparative law and the legal system within which the business
operations are conducted. This section provides a selective look
at the following foreign criminal laws: corruption and bribery
laws; securities laws on insider trading; environmental crimes;
tax offenses; and anti-money laundering laws.
A. Corruption and Bribery Laws
Additional requirements exist outside the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act discussed above.2"5 U.S. businesses that conduct
international operations must concern themselves with foreign
laws that apply to their operations. Businesses making payments
abroad must also be aware of foreign laws criminalizing bribery
of foreign officials. The corruption of foreign government
officials is expressly prohibited in virtually all countries to-
day.236 Foreign investors often complain that these laws are
vague and unevenly enforced as some payments may stand on
the border of legality and illegality. 3 7  In response, the
international community has undertaken multilateral action to
prevent corrupt business practices. For example, the United
Nations established an intergovernmental working group to draft
an international agreement aimed at "preventing and eliminat-
ing illicit payments related to international business transac-
tions.""' Moreover, the OECD prohibits corrupt practices in
its Guidelines to multinational corporations. 39 However, these
provisions are not binding. U.S. businesses should retain
experienced and qualified counsel in the foreign jurisdiction
because corruption provisions are often enforced at the
discretion of the government in power.
235. See supra Part ILA.
236. Judson J. Wambold, Note, Prohibiting Foreign Bribes: Criminal Sanctions for
Corporate Payments Abroad, 10 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 231, 235 n.26 (1977) (refer to the
chart in n.26).
237. Id. at 236 n.27.
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1. Middle East Countries24
The following countries are often identified as Middle
Eastern jurisdictions: Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Egypt,
Sudan, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, Saudi Arabia, the United
Arab Emirates, Yemen Arab Republic, Kuwait, Iraq, and
Turkey.241 Each country statutorily prohibits bribery of its
officials.2 42 However, the scope of this prohibition varies from
one country to another in three main respects: (1) the legal
studies nature of the person prohibited from receiving a
payment, (2) the type of consideration prohibited, and (3) the
purpose of the payor.243
a. Status of the Person Prohibited From Receiving a
Payment
Each Middle Eastern country prohibits illegal payments to
"public officials." Some domestic laws define the term and
consider as public officials "all individuals entrusted with a
public service. "244 It is unclear whether such a broad interpre-
tation would prevail in countries that leave the term "public
official" undefined.245 A cautious attitude should be followed
by U.S. businesses operating in these countries since enforce-
ment of such highly political laws can vary widely from year to
year.
Payments to foreign officials are often made through agents.
Either the corporations deem it useful, or the Middle Eastern
nations require that foreign businesses employ an agent when
dealing with the government. 24  United States corporations
often pay a large "compensation" to these agents for their
240. Including Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Sudan, Israel, Jordan,
Lebanon, Syria, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Yemen Arab Republic, Kuwait,
Iraq, and Turkey.
241. See generally Philip J. Suse, Questionable Payments in the Middle East: Potential
Liability of American Corporations, 4J. OF COMP. CORP. L. & SEC. REG. 101-02, (1982).
242. Id. at 104.
243. Id.
244. Id. at 105 n.22; see, e.g., Law No. 58 ofJuly 31, 1937 (amended 1962), in Al-
Mawsuah-al-Musriyah lil-Tashri Wa'al-Quada (compilation of Egyptian Legisla-
tion) (1962).
245. Suse, supra note 241 at 106.
246. Id. at 107.
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services. Such payments are not unlawful in and of them-
selves.247 However, many Middle Eastern countries consider it
unlawful if the agent is merely a conduit for payments that are
eventually received by an official.2 8 The payor may be able to
avoid fines by showing he or she did not know the final
destination of the payments. 249 Most Middle Eastern statutes
do not require the corporation to inquire about postpayment
activities of an agent.250 Businesses should document, whenev-
er possible, the legal purpose of a payment (e.g., the require-
ment that it only be used for proper purposes).
Finally, Middle Eastern countries are divided on whether
payments for actions outside public functions of the official are
punishable.251 Most domestic laws criminalize these payments.
For instance, in Saudi Arabia, regulations prohibit payments to
an official aimed at using "his genuine or alleged influence" to
try to get from any public authority, works, ordinances, deci-
sions, commitments, concessions, procurement contracts, or a
job, service, or any kind of privilege.
252
247. Id.
248. Id. at 108 n.38 (citing Criminal Code of Sudan, Chap. 13(1), art. 129, Law No.
64 of 1974, in GazettaJumhuriyat al-Sudan al-Dimugraiyah (Official Gazette) No. 1162
ofJune 30, 1974 (Library of Congress translation)). According to the translation:
Anyone who accepts, takes, or agrees to accept or tries to take any
kind of gift, for himself or another, as an incentive or reward to
induce a public official, by corruption and illegal means to:
a. perform or refrain from performing any official act;
b. show, in the performance of his duty, partiality for or against
any individual; or
c. render any service to any person, or cause him damage, or
attempt to cause any of these to any government agency or
public official, shall be punished by imprisonment for a period
not exceeding 5 years, or a fine, or both penalties.
Id.
249. Id. at 108.
250. Id.
251. Id. at n.49, (comparing, Jordan, Criminal Code of Jordan, arts. 170-73 in
GazettaJumhuriyat al-Sudan al-Dinugritiyah (Official Gazette) No. 1162 of June 30,
1974 (Library of Congress translation) and Iran, Iranian Criminal Code of 1925-26 in
Nasri, Magmj'ah-i Mudawan-i gavanin va mugarrat-ijaza'i (1971) (holding outside acts
permitted) with Saudi Arabia, Regulations against Bribery, art. 5, Decree No. 15 of
August 1962 (Library of Congress translation) (holding outside acts punishable)).
252. See Suse, supra note 241, at 110.
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b. Types of Considerations Prohibited
An illicit benefit is usually prohibited. The following
transactions would be sanctioned in most Middle Eastern
jurisdictions: payment of cash; gifts of property (i.e., jewelry or
art items); gifts of services (i.e. automobiles or aircraft); and
granting of unsecured loans. 53 A few countries, like Kuwait
and Sudan, specify which benefits are illegal.254
c. Purpose of the Payor
In Middle Eastern countries, the payment must be made
with corruptive intent to be illegal. The payment must be
intended to induce the official to misuse his position. 5 The
so-called "aggressive payments," made directly in exchange for
new business, address this element of intent. 56 Invariably,
"grease payments" are deemed lawful if they are made to
expedite actions that low-level officials would perform any-
way.
257
Other payments, such as "defensive payments," may be
deemed lawful.258 In this situation, payment is made to avoid
adverse governmental action.2 59  However, it seems that only
a physical or personal threat is likely to exonerate the payor.2 °
Economic threats, such as the possibility of expropriation or
nationalization of a business does not legitimize a payment.
26
As to sanctions on bribery, most Middle Eastern countries
levy fines or compel imprisonment which generally does not
253. See id. at 111 & n.52.
254. See id. at 111 (citing Criminal Code of Sudan, Chap. 13(1) arts. 128, 132);
Kuwait, Crimes Violating the Duty of a Public Official, Law No. 31 of 1970, art. 114(3)
(amending Law No. 16 of 1960)).
255. See id. at 112.
256. Id. at 113 & n. 69.
257. Id. at 115-16 & n. 81.
258. Id. at 114 & n.73.
259. Id.
260. Id. at 114 (quoting Iranian Criminal Code, art. 251). But see Morocco,
Criminal Code of Morocco, art. 251, Ordinance No. 1-59-413 of November 26, 1962
(Library of Congress Translation) (ruling out defense of economic or physical
coercion).
261. Suse, supra note 241, at 115 & n.78.
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exceed five years.' 62 Civil penalties may also be imposed, such
as a prohibition from operating in the country.
2 63
The enforcement of bribery statutes has been extremely
uneven and inconsistent because prosecution of bribery is
discretionary by nature."4 Political and economic consider-
ations often influence decisions to investigate and/or prosecute
bribery.2165 Obviously, some governments cannot afford the
disclosure of bribery scandals. It follows that a large number of
questionable payments are not challenged, despite well-publi-
cized anti-bribery campaigns in several Middle Eastern countries.
In brief, it is difficult for a foreign corporation to know precisely
if its actions are likely to be criminal. Even though all Middle
Eastern countries expressly prohibit bribery of their public
officials, 266 anti-bribery statutes are frequently vague and
unpredictable.
2. Germany
The Strafgesetzbuch ("StGb") defines the crimes of
government officials and employers, or what may be termed
corruption. 267  Sections 331-335a StGb govern circumstances
which include payment and acceptance of bribes and nonfinan-
cial advantages in return for past, present, and future favors.2 s
A subchapter addressing criminal offenses by public officials
includes passive corruption.269  Bribing judges and arbitrators
in Germany can result in three years imprisonment or a
fine.27 ° Committing the same act with other officials, such as
civil servants, can bring two years of prison or a fine. 1  In
situations where an official violates his or her duties to grant the
desired favor, the offeror of the bribe is subject to imprisonment
262. Id. at 116 & app. III (detailing penalties to which bribery is subject).
263. Id.
264. Id. at 117.
265. Id.
266. See supra Part IIIA.1.
267. STRAGESETZBUCH § 331-335a (F.R.G.).
268. Id. §§ 331-335a.
269. See id. § 331, Simple Passive Bribery (authorizing punishment of governmental
officials who accept bribes); § 332, Aggravated Passive Bribery (punishing government
officials for accepting a benefit for performing an official act).
270. See id. § 333(2).
271. See id. § 333(1).
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from three months to five years.272 In less severe cases covered
under section 332(1) StGb, the offeror is subject to imprison-
ment of not more than three years or a fine.273 If the offeree
is a judge or arbitrator who violates certain official duties, the
attempt and granting of the desired favor is punishable by
imprisonment for three months to five years.
274
3. France
Article 179 of the French Penal Code defines the offense of
corruption as the intentional use of violence or threat of
violence, gifts or promise of gifts for the purpose of obtaining
an action or abstention from action by a public official.
27 5
French courts have interpreted broadly acts which constitute
bribery, i.e., violence or threat of violence, and gifts or a
promise of gifts. The French Supreme Court even considers
indirect words or writings of threats that lead a public official to
think that libelous disclosures could be made against him as
within the scope of Article 177.276
The act in purpose must be accomplished by an official act
or even abstention.277 The act can be one within official
function or merely an act facilitated by official function. 8
For example, Article 179 would apply to a bribe for the purpose
of asking a public official to influence other officials or to gain
information about other people with whom the official may
272. Id. at § 334(2).
273. Id. § 332(1).
274. Id.
275. See, e.g., DELMAS-MARY, supra note 238, at 91.
276. Id. at 92-93. See Court of Cassation, Chambre Criminelle, Nov. 21, 1977; see also
cases separated into two corruption categories in the French Penal Code: "Corruption-
Passive," and "Corruption Active." These cases are fully cited as:
Corruption Passive That after intention is established in the corrupt
act as non conclusive on the facts, complacent acts can qualify as a
violation.
CitingCrim., 6 Oct. 1971, BulL, 251; JCP, 1971.11.16906; RSC, 1972.104 et 120; 14 Mai
1986, BulL, 163 RSC, 1987.685.
Corruption Active. That the French Courts view the nature of the
corrupt act in a case, particularly regarding solicitations (new
business) pendant upon sexual relations.
Citing T. enf. Sarreguemines, 11 mai 1967, JCP, 1968.11.15359, note Sigalas; RSC,
1968.329, et, clans le cas des menaces, Crim., 21 nov. 1977, BuL, 356...
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deal.27 9  Acts of abstention may include the failure of an
official to check submitted documents or excuse irregularities
committed by a corporation. 80
The French impose penalties in the form of a fine. The
amount levied is twice the amount of money represented by the
gift act, whether given or promised. A minimum fine of 1,500




Articles 288, 315 and 316 of the Swiss Penal Code prohibit
a promise and/or giving bribes.283 The receipt of bribes or
facilitating such payments are also prohibited.284 However,
Swiss law does not punish a corporation making "grease
payments"; only a public official is subject to punishment.
285
The definition of public official is rather vague and seems
not as broad as the French equivalent. In Switzerland, the term
encompasses judges, arbitrators, court room interpreters, and
generally any official.28 6 Moreover, the act of bribing a mere
citizen that is temporarily in charge of a public service is not
within the scope of the Penal Code.28 7
In 1973, Switzerland signed a Treaty of Mutual Assistance
in Criminal Matters with the United States. 28  The act of
bribing a public official is an offense for which mutual assistance
is available. 289 These acts include ascertaining the where-
279. Article 179 applies to all individuals vested with a public function: elected
officials at the national or local level; civil servants regardless of their position; and any
citizen entrusted with any kind of public service whether permanently or temporarily.
Id. at 87.
280. Id. at 89.
281. Id. at 86 (for passive corrupt acts, which fall under Article 177); id. at 91 (for
active corrupt acts, which fall under Article 179).
282. Most of this section summarizes A. Lachat-Heritier, Commercial Bribes: The Swiss
Answer, 5J. OF COMPARATIVE BUSINESS & CAPITAL MARKET LAw 79 (1983).
283. Id. at 81.
284. Id.
285. Id.
286. Id. at 81 n.7 (citing Swiss PENAL CODE, arts. 110, 288 & 315).
287. Id. at 81.
288. Id. at 83 n. 11 (giving citation for the Treaty on Mutual Assistance in Criminal
Matters, May 25, 1973, U.S.-Switz., at 27 U.S.T. 2019, T.I.A.S. No. 8302). For further
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abouts of persons, taking testimony from persons, and effecting
the production of documents.2"
In brief, Switzerland is one country where corruption of
officials is most severely proscribed. According to Lachat-
Heritier, incidence of bribery of public officials is also low.291
Bribery is not common because political power is decentralized
in Switzerland, and thus, public officials are under close scrutiny
by their constituents. 292 Additionally, the majority of public
officials in Switzerland are elected, not appointed. 93
B. Foreign Securities Laws on Insider Trading
The United States has been a pioneer in developing
sophisticated regulatory and enforcement laws regarding
securities transactions, especially in the area of insider trading.
Foreign countries with major capital markets have enacted
similar laws in recent years. The European Union ("E.U.") is a
prime example that demonstrates the design and implementa-
tion of insider trading laws.294 The European Union states
have developed a mix of legal and non-legal regulatory and
enforcement provisions against insider trading. In 1989, an E.U.
Directive required the states to harmonize their regulatory
regimes. 295 For purposes of brevity, this account discusses only
this Directive.
The E.U. Directive is an effort to respond to Union-wide
threats posed by insider dealing. The Directive alms to build on
United Kingdom and French experience in this area of regula-tion.296
Most importantly, member states are required for the first
time to "prohibit" and penalize insider trading.297  The
290. Id.
291. Id.
292. Id. at 83.
293. Id.
294. See generally MARK STALLWORTHY, Legal Regulation of Insider Dealing in the United
Kingdom and the European Community, in INTERNATIONAL TRADE AVOIDING CRIMINAL
RISKS, Ch. 3 (William M. Hannay ed., 1991) [hereinafter STALLWORTHY].
295. Council Directive No. 89/592/EEC of 13 November 1989, coordinating
regulations on insider dealing, 1989 O.J. (L 334), available in LEXIS, INTLAW Library,
ECIAW File [hereinafter Council Directive]. See generally Klaus J. Hopt, The European
Insider Dealing Directive, 27 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 51 (1990) (discussing the develop-
ment of the European Insider Dealing Directive).
296. Hopt, supra note 296, at 51-52.
297. Council Directive, supra note 295, arts. 2-5.
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directive is a minimum standard measure. Thus, member states
can make stricter provisions than those required by Community
law.298
The Directive defines inside information as:
information which has not been made public, which is of a
precise nature relating to one or several issuers of transfer-
able securities or to one or several transferable securities,
which, if it were made public, would be likely to have a
significant effect on the price of the transferable security or
securities in question.299
The nature of the inside trading prohibitions are best
understood by first looking at the categories of persons brought
under legal control.
The Directive applies insider dealing prohibitions to
primary insiders for any person who possesses information by
administrative membership, financial interests, or scope of duty.
It also applies prohibitions by forbidding certain actions.
300
Primary insiders are required neither to deal nor to influence
others to deal in breach of the terms of the Directive.0 '
The Directive makes available exemptions and defenses. It
excludes certain legitimate operations from its prohibitions in
298. Id. art. 13, sentence 1.
299. Id. art. 1 (1).
300. Id. art. 2. The Directive explains:
Each member state shall prohibit any person who: by virtue of his
membership of [sic] the administrative, management or supervisory
bodies of the issuer, by virtue of his holding in the capital of the
issuer, or because he has access to such information by virtue of the
exercise of his employment, profession or duties, possesses inside
information from taking advantage of that information with full
knowledge of the fact, by acquiring or disposing of for his own
account or for the account of a third party, either directly or
indirectly, transferable securities of the issuer or issuers to which that
information relates.
Id. art. 2(1).
Each member state shall prohibit other persons who, with full knowledge of the
facts, possess inside information if the direct or indirect source of that inside
information could not be other than a primary insider. Id. art. 4. The Directive also
prohibits "secondary" insiders from acquiring or disposing of transferable securities.
Id. art. 5.
301. See id. art. 2 (stating that a primary insider is prohibited from taking advantage
of inside information for their own benefit or the benefit of a third party); id. art. 3
(stating that a primary insider is prohibited from "disclosing. .. inside information to
any third party" or, on that basis, "recommending or procuring a third party... to
acquire or dispose of transferable securities," but it does not extend liability to tipping
by a secondary insider).
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the Preamble. °2 The Directive does not apply to "transactions
carried out in pursuit of monetary, exchange-rate or public debt-
management policies by a sovereign State, by its central bank or
any other body designated to that effect by the State, or by any
person acting on their behalf."
3 0 1
The nature of transferable securities is key to understanding
the concept of inside information. The Directive defines
transferable securities as instruments "admitted to trading on a
market which is regulated and supervised by authorities
recognized by public bodies, operates regularly and is accessible
directly or indirectly to the public."0 4 Member states can
assert that the directive's prohibitions do not apply to transac-
tions "effected without the involvement of a professional
intermediary outside [an official] market."
3 5
The Directive requires E.U. members to impose penalties
for violations of insider dealing. 6 The Directive leaves the
administration of penalties to each member state, which is to be
"sufficient to promote compliance with [E.U.] measures."307
Under the Directive each member state is to ensure that the
Directive's provisions are applied and that these provisions are
given "all supervisory and investigatory powers that are necessary
for the exercise of their functions."0" Domestic enforcement
authorities must be established by each E.U. member when it is
necessary to collaborate with other authorities.0 9
302. Id. Directive Preamble. The following are not considered use of inside
information:
[(1)] the mere fact that market-makers, bodies authorized to act as
"contrepartie," or stockbrokers with inside information confine them-
selves, in the first two cases, to pursuing their normal business of
buying or selling securities or, in the last, to carrying out an or-
der...
[(2)] the fact of carrying out transactions with the aim of stabilizing
the price of new issues or secondary offers of transferable securities;
[or]...
[(3)]any transaction carried out on the basis of.. .estimates
[developed from publicly available data].
Id.
303. Id. art. 2(4).
304. Id. art. 1(2). The covered instruments include shares and debt securities, puts
and calls, futures, options, and index contracts. Id.
305. Id. art. 2(3).
306. Stallworthy, supra note 294, at ch. 3, § 3.03.
307. Council Directive, supra note 295, art. 13.
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The Directive requires a duty of cooperation, which
includes the exchange of information between authorities across
frontiers "whenever necessary for the purpose of carrying out
their duties.""' ° The exchange by the member states should
include information on prohibited actions under the options in
Articles 2 and 3 of the Directive which compel more stringent
provisions than those of the Directive that request coopera-
tion.3 11
Many E.U. member states have concluded bilateral agree-
ments or memoranda of understanding with foreign countries
to gather and exchange regulatory information or intelligence
in corporate securities law.312 E.U. member states have already
enacted insider trading laws and have prosecuted under these
regulations. In March 1994, the media reported the first
conviction under the insider trading law in Italy.
313
C. Foreign Environmental Offenses
Some of the world's most tragic and significant ecological
disasters have resulted in part from transnational investment,
such as in Bhopal, India, in 1984 and the gradual process of
deforestation in Brazil's Amazon region.314  Environmental
problems in many foreign countries are broad and include air,
water, noise pollution and soil erosion. These countries also
face future world-wide environmental issues, such as the
enhanced greenhouse effect, global warming, and the use or
release of genetically manipulated organisms. Environmental
issues are regularly displayed by the media in most countries and
have become mainstream political issues.1 '
310. Id. art. 10(1).
311. See Stallworthy, supra note 294, § 3.06C; Council Directive, supra note 295, art.
10(1) (cross-referencing articles 5, 6).
312. See Stallworthy, supra note 294, § 3.06C.
313. Public Prosecutor Opens Inquiry Into Suspected Insider Trading of Montedison and
Ferruzzi Stock, II SOLE-24 ORE, Nov. 23, 1994 at 30; CONSOB Reports Ten Cases of Insider
Trading to Authorities, II SOLE-24 ORE, Oct. 26, 1994 at 31.
314. For an excellent overview, see Anna Alvazzi del Frate and Jennifer Norberry,
Rounding Up: Themes and Issues, in ENVIRONMENTAL CRIME, SANCTIONING STRATEGIES AND
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 1-21 (United Nationals Interregional Crime and Justice
Research Institute, Publication No. 50 Nov. 1993) [hereinafter NORBERRY].
315. Id. at 4 n.13.
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A comparative discussion of approaches to environmental
crimes is difficult because environmental protection operates in
many countries at quite different levels-national, state, and
local-or combinations of levels. It is also not possible to
compare enforcement data between countries, because in some
countries, access to data is a problem. In other countries,
environmental protection systems are either minuscule or so
recent in origin that little or no information is available. For
these reasons, this section will identify and briefly discuss issues
and trends including criminal enforcement of foreign environ-
mental law. 16
Several developed countries are enforcing statutory
environmental protection through a more aggressive use of
criminal law.317 Other bodies of the law are used, such as
public health or resource statutes, and in some cases, civil codes.
For instance, polluting the environment is often sanctioned in
the context of endangering public health or under a nuisance
theory.
3 18
Constitutional issues are also an important tool in environ-
mental enforcement in that a constitution may provide guaran-
tees of environmental protection.319 The protection afforded
by delegating responsibility for environmental matters through
a constitutional division of power may be decreased with each
level of delegation. 2 ° Delegation to the various government
levels may also impair the cooperation necessary to coordinate
an efficient enforcement strategy.
3 21
Some governments have provided constitutional guarantees
protecting the environment by placing obligations on the state
and its citizens to further strengthen and protect the environ-
ment (e.g., the Constitutions of Brazil and China).322 These
countries give citizens the constitutional right to remedy
environmental degradation through independent legal ac-
323tion.
316. Id. at 1.
317. Id.
318. Id. at 6.
319. Id. at 6-7.
320. Id.
321. Id.
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Enforcement of environmental protection loses its strength
in actual implementation. For example, even though Article
225 of the Brazilian Constitution imposes penal liability upon
legal persons for environmental degradation, Brazilian constitu-
tional provisions are not self-executing.124  The Brazilian
judiciary only recognizes environmental liability of legal persons
under ordinary law.325 Therefore, since Article 225, paragraph
4, has not been given the effect of ordinary law, the constitution-
al provision has no teeth.326
National constitutions were typically adopted prior to the
development of modem environmental laws. In many countries,
the local government units may enjoy residual power in areas
not specifically reserved in the federal constitution. Often, the
environment is not given specific mention in the national
constitution. 32 7  Environmental laws in some nations are
incidentally linked to other constitutional powers such as
commerce, territorial maritime jurisdiction and foreign af-
fairs.
328
When the division of power is not clear, such as in Argenti-
na,3 29 confusion and uncertainty over direct responsibility may
exist. The confusion can develop into conflict when the
national government attempts to legislate or enforce environ-
mental protection matters traditionally reserved to the state
governments, as in Nigeria. s°
Many countries have "a multi-tiered environmental protec-
tion structure" at state or provincial and local government
levels.33 ' The result is several different models of environmen-
tal protection.32 Some agencies are focused and specialize in
environmental protection, whereas in other government
agencies, environmental protection is merely an incidental
324. Id.




329. Id. For example, in Argentina, Australia and Nigeria, the political subdivisions
have power over matters not specifically set forth in the constitution. Id.
330. Id. at 7.
331. Id. at 8. An example is Australia, which has the Victorian and New South
Wales Environmental Protection Authorities. Id. n.24.
332. Id. at 8.
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responsibility.333 Several environmental protection agencies
are entrusted with one or more functions of formulating policy,
setting standards, and administering and enforcing rules or
laws.
334
Persons foreign to a particular country can experience
problems due to a lack of coordination between the agencies,
and their individual and sometimes undefined responsibilities.
The potential for conflict between agencies operating at
national, state and provincial, and local levels is ever pres-
ent.15 As a result, it is extremely important to understand the
legal frameworks of foreign environmental criminal law.
There are two identified legal models of environmental
protection.3 6 The first model utilizes a central environmental
code (e.g., the Australian States of Victoria, Western Australia
and Tasmania) .3" The second model employs separate laws
for various environmental concerns (e.g., China, India, and the
Australian States of New South Wales, Queensland and South
Australia) . 3  However, these models are not mutually exclu-
sive. An additional model exists in countries where environmen-
tal protection is found indirectly, through laws covering natural
resources such as fisheries, forests, minerals and water (e.g.,
Argentina, Brazil and Tunisia)."' It is difficult to work
through these legislative frameworks. Fragmentation, inconsis-
tency, duplication and gaps are compounded by amendments to
environmentally-related legislation, many of which date back to
the early part of the century.
3 °
333. Id.
334. Id. at 8 n.25. As an example in Brazil:
[The] National System for the Protection of the Environment
(SISNAMA) includes a Federal Council of Environment Protection
(CSMA), which assists in the drafting of national environmental
policy, a National Board on Environment (CONNAMA), which
makes decisions about norms and standards, and the Brazilian
Institute of Environment and Renewable Natural Resources
(IBAMA), which coordinates and implements national environ-
mental policy.
Id.
335. Id. at 8.
336. Id.
337. Id. at 8-9.
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Substantive criminal law is an increasingly important
element of the environmental protection legal framework in
many countries. 3 1  Three basic legal sanctions are used for
environmental enforcement.314 2 The first sanction utilizes
criminal law and quasi-criminal or regulatory offenses. 43 The
second employs administrative sanctions and the third, civil
sanctions.34 Although many countries protect the environ-
ment primarily through civil or administrative sanctions, the use
of criminal penalties is on the rise.345
Criminal codes, statutes and administrative environmental
protection statutes usually include criminal sanctions.s46 The
penalty for an environmental offense is typically a fine or
imprisonment, or both.3 47 Some countries are attempting to
strengthen their penal sanctions by increasing maximum initial
fines, levying higher fines for repeat offenders, imposing larger
fines for corporations than for individuals and, issuing daily
fines for on-going offenses.3 48  The threats of significant
economic penalties are designed to deter potential offenders
belying the view that fines are merely a cost of doing busi-
ness.3
4 9
Imprisonment is another means to punish environmental
offenders. Some nations include imprisonment in public health
offense and nuisance provisions of criminal codes or in adminis-
trative environmental statutes.50 In Nigeria and Argentina,
violators of hazardous waste laws may be imprisoned;351 in
Nigeria imprisonment could be for life.352  Environmental
protection agency officials in some jurisdictions incur both
criminal and civil liability for environmental destruction
resulting from a violation of their statutory duty.353  One
341. Id.








350. Id. Furthermore, in some jurisdictions in Australia, parties guilty of aggravated
pollution may be imprisoned for up to seven years. Id.
351. Id.
352. Id.
353. Id. at ll.
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country indirectly imposes criminal liability on corporations by
sanctioning corporate employees.354
Variations among national environmental criminal laws exist
in standards of culpability and evidentiary requirements. These
variations include the establishment of intent, proving pollution
or damaging effects, and "linking the pollution, the substance
and the polluter."355 The result is a trend toward new mecha-
nisms that allow better application and enforcement of criminal
responsibility. 56
Strict liability is the solution used by some nations to avoid
the problems that occur when criminal law is imposed. 57 In
these countries, a defense of honest and reasonable mistake is
useless.58
In some jurisdictions, a corporate official automatically
becomes a defendant and must overcome a presumption of guilt
if his or her corporation is found in violation of environmental
laws.359 Unless corporate directors and managers can establish
a specified defense, such as due diligence and lack of knowledge
of the contravention, some agency laws assume they are
guilty. 
3 W
It is important to understand the effect of international
conventions and agreements on environmental issues within the
national laws and regulations of each country. In many
countries these international conventions may not be self-
executing and require implementing legislation, despite the fact
that the conventions and agreements have been ratified. 6 '
D. Foreign Tax Offenses
Due to increasing international business transactions, a
trend exists for legislators, intergovernmental agencies and
organizations to focus on the phenomenon of tax crimes. The
governments' need to obtain more tax revenue and ensure
354. Id. Such attempts were made in the former Czechoslovakia. Id.
355. Id.
356. Id.
357. Id. at 12.
358. Id.
359. Id. at 13.
360. Id. at 13 (referring to Australia-New South Wales Environmental Offenses and
Penalties Act 1989, section 10(1); Victoria Environment Protection Act 1970, section
66B(1A); Nigeria-Federal Environmental Protection Agency Act.)
361. Id. at 18.
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equity motivates the fight against evasion. There has been a
tendency towards a closer examination of noncompliance,
including the forms it can take and the techniques for counter-
acting it. In international and regional bodies, there have been
several studies on the growing efforts against tax noncompli-
ance. Indeed, some countries, such as Malta, have alleged that
deprivations of the Convention are reasons for its decision not
to sign the Council of Europe Organization of Economic
Cooperation and Development Convention on Mutual Adminis-
trative Assistance in Tax Matters.
This section only considers preliminary examples of tax
crime and distinguishes between tax evasion and tax fraud. 62
Further, this section reviews general tax legal theories (e.g., the
concept of abuse of law), special measures taken by some coun-
tries, and international cooperation against international tax
evasion. The treatment of tax evasion in selected countries is
then considered.
1. Substantive Aspects
Substantive aspects of tax crimes can be important in
determining whether one country will cooperate in the prosecu-
tion or enforcement of a criminal tax prosecution.
a. Tax Evasion
Tax evasion occurs when "the taxpayer intentionally avoids
payment without avoiding the tax liability."3 63 The taxpayer
who is guilty of tax evasion has unquestionably broken the law.
However, many countries do not agree on the definition of
evasion. This is due to differing attitudes toward the constitu-
ent elements of evasion, such as the behavior or action of the
taxpayer in order to avoid payment of taxes.3' For instance,
the taxpayer may evade taxes by inaction such as failing to file
returns for income, paying the tax authority amounts deducted
from employees' wages, or providing the authorities with the
information necessary to proceed to an assessment.365 Addi-
362. See generally, 68a Cahiers De Drit Fiscal International [Studies on International Fiscal
Law] (1983) [hereinafter IFA Studies].
363. V. Uckmar, General Report, in IFA Studies, supra note 362, at 20 [hereinafter
Uckmar].
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tionally, tax evasion may result from fraudulent acts, such as
falsifying accounts, submitting false declarations, faking invoices,
claiming fictitious deductions, improperly characterizing
expenses and income, etc.
366
In most countries, a taxpayer's act of omission or inaction
and active behavior can result in tax evasion.367 "The differ-
ences between acts of omission and active behavior has no
special significance in most jurisdictions."" However, for the
purpose of the application of criminal sanctions, the analysis of
the different ways in which evasion can occur may be significant
in identifying the place where the unlawful behavior occurs.
3 69
Some countries apply the criterion of the place where the action
or omission occurs. Other countries focus on the place where
the effect occurs, while others use the criterion of where the
illegitimacy is ascertained.3 70  The most serious problem in
many countries, and indeed in international law, is not so much
distinguishing between "tax evasion" and "fraud" or between
"evasion" and "avoidance,"371 but rather of delimiting the
scope of "tax avoidance."372 It can be difficult for businesses
with international operations to make long-term business plans
when governments have different concepts of avoidance and
evasion as well as when governments change these concepts and
begin to criminalize behavior over time.
373
Tax evasion may result from a taxpayer's intentional
deception. 74 The taxpayer's mens rea may be an evil state of
mind, such as bad faith, intent to evade taxes, or willfulness.37 5
However, sometimes a transaction that appears to be a willful
evasion, upon examination, will reveal that the violation resulted





370. Id. See alsoJ. Van Hoorn Jr., The Use and Abuse of Tax Havens, in TAX HAVENS
AND MEAsURES AGAINST TAX EVASION AND AVOIDANCE IN THE EEC 1-10 (J.F. AveryJones
ed., 1974) [hereinafter TAX HAVENS] (discussing the difficulty between tax evasion and
tax avoidance in the international context).
371. Uckmar, supra note 362 at 2-23.
372. Id.
373. SeeJud Harwood et al., The U.S. and UK Lock Horns Over a U.S. Transfer-Pricing
Criminal Investigation, 44 TAXES INTERNATIONAL 3 (June 1983).
374. Id.
375. Uckmar, supra note 362, at 21.
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instances, the incompetence of bookkeepers or an honest, but
mistaken interpretation of the applicable law may erroneously
suggest willful evasion. 76 In addition to willful behavior, the
taxpayer's evasion can occur due to "ignorance (unawareness of
the law), error (miscalculation), or negligence (for example,
failure to safeguard records).""'
In somejurisdictions, such as Austria, Greece, Luxembourg,
Norway, France, Denmark, Switzerland, Israel and Italy, tax
evasion does not usually require the taxpayer to intend the
178evasion. However, willful avoidance of tax payment is the
most common form of evasion.3 79  Nevertheless, intent to
evade is required to establish a criminal offense. s0
When the law regarding tax evasion requires an intentional
act "motive is inferred from the demonstration as a matter of
fact that 'concealment' or 'disguise' (for example, France) has
occurred."38 ' The courts in some jurisdictions determine
intent on a case-by-case basis in accordance with applicable
criminal law."2  Willful evasion can thus "be inferred from
false data, clear contradiction between books, documents and
other correlative records, and data contained in sworn state-
ments which might imply an incomplete declaration of the
taxable matter.""3
In most countries, unintentional evasion results only in the
obligation to pay interest on the additional tax assessment and
in the imposition of penalties.s 4 In other jurisdictions, such
as Denmark, the same approach is used, however the application
is limited to unintentional evasion resulting from negligence,
and not to gross negligence."3 Nevertheless, these circum-
376. Id.





382. Id. (citing Israel, Argentina, and Germany as examples).
383. Id.
384. Id. (citing Israel as an example).
385. Id. For example, in Denmark, the same approach is used, however, the
application is limited to unintentional evasion resulting from negligence, and not to
gross negligence. Id. On the other hand, Italy "does not distinguish between inten-
tional and unintentional evasion or ordinary negligence/gross negligence." Id. In
Germany and Austria, evasion always requires the taxpayer to intend the evasion. Id.
However, if the taxpayer confesses before the tax authorities discover the evasion,
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stances may normally be considered by tax courts, "which are
legally entitled not to apply penalties if the interpretation of the
law is controversial." 8 6 A survey concluded that it is not possi-
ble to identify with reasonable certainty the common criteria or
underlying concepts of evasion analysis.38
7
b. Tax Fraud
Tax fraud is characterized by the payer's specific intent to
evade taxes. s8 Most countries criminalize fraud and thus have
elaborate legislative provisions regarding the psychological
element. 9
In international tax cooperation, some countries, such as
Switzerland, provide for mutual assistance only if the matter of
the proceedings is a case of tax fraud and not of simple
"evasion."3 °  The European Convention on Extradition
Protocol, provides for extradition "whenever, under the law of
the requested State, the fiscal offense corresponds to a violation
of the same nature."391
c. General Measures to Combat International Tax Evasion
Each country has measures to combat international tax
evasion. 92 Civil law countries developed a theory of abuse of
law "under which no one can exercise his rights in conflict with
the function to which the right was attributed."39 3  In tax
punishment can be avoided. Id.
386. Id.
387. Id.
388. Id. at 22-23.
389. Id. at 23.
390. Id.
391. Id. For additional discussion of Swiss cooperation policies in international tax,
see, e.g., 3 Tax Treaties (CCH) 9158.28 (1990); Mario Kronauer, Information Given for
Tax Purposes from Switzerland to Foreign Countries Especially to the United States for the
Prevention of Fraud or the Like in Relation to Certain American Taxes, 30 TAx L. REV. 47
(1974); Dr. Walter Meier, Banking Secrecy in Swiss and International Taxation, 7 INT'L
LAW. 16 (1973).
392. Uckmar, supra note 362, at 24. These measures can take several forms, includ-
ing "statutory provisions, administrative procedures, or the development of case law."
Id.
393. Id. at 26. This concept is a constituent element in the judicial systems of these
jurisdictions. Id. In Portugal, Germany, Argentina, the Netherlands, and France, the
"abuse of law" theory is applied in tax matters. Id. at 26-27. Slightly different
approaches are taken in each country. In Germany and France, for instance, "the
motive (intent to avoid tax) must be accompanied by the artificiality (abnormality) of
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jurisprudence, the abuse of law principle protects the state's
interest vis-a-vis the taxpayer's liberty to choose which lawful
means to produce income.
In addition to the above-mentioned measures against tax
evasion, many countries "have enacted ad hoc provisions to
counteract illegitimate reductions of tax burdens when the
taxable objects or subjects cross national boundaries."
391
For example, in order to reduce the loss of revenue when
persons transfer their residence, "some countries have extended
the unlimited tax liability of the individual for a period of years
subsequent to the transfer of residence." 96 In some jurisdic-
tions it is merely a presumption. 97 Canada, for instance,
imposes a "departure tax" on a taxpayer who ceases to be a
resident of Canada and has "disposed of the whole of his assets
(other than property remaining subject to Canadian taxation)
at their fair market value at the time of his emigration."
39
Efforts to prevent loss of revenue may lead countries to
characterize different events as evasion.3 99 For instance, some
countries, such as Greece, Brazil, Argentina and Italy, consider
non-arm's-length transactions as tax evasion. 0  Nonresident
taxpayers can encounter tax evasion charges in the case of tax-
ation of investment income at source and capital gains tax on
the disposal of real estate (and shareholdings).401
Many countries also have employed exchange control and
tax clearance laws that are important mechanisms in detecting
the legal form which is chosen to achieve a given economic result." Id. at 27.
Germany determines this latter factor "on the basis of the taxpayer's deviation from the
course of conduct normally taken by a businessman." Id. In the Netherlands, the
concept of "fraus legis," which, in contrast with Germany and France, is not given
statutory expression, is used by the courts to replace the "nontaxable" transaction with
a "taxable" transaction, when the exclusive purpose of avoiding is combined with a fac-
tual situation economically equivalent to the one that the legislation intended to give
rise to a tax liability. Id.
394. Id. at 27.
395. Id. at 32-34.
396. Id. at 34.
397. Id.
398. Id. at 35.
399. Id. Some triggering events concern the residence of companies. Evasion may
include, inter alia: avoidance of residence; migration and transfer of assets; and transfer
pricing. Id. at 35-36.
400. Id. at 36.
401. Id. at 38-39.
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and prosecuting tax evasion.1 2  Tax-motivated exchange
control measures may range from a reporting obligation, which
constitutes a further source of information for tax authorities, to
the prohibition on exporting business (or portfolio) income or
capital without prior tax clearance. The control measures may
deny authorization for the establishment, purchase or expansion
of affiliated companies located in tax haven jurisdictions or deny
authorizations conditioned on the repatriation of a certain
proportion of income. °" Some countries have also made tax
clearance certificates mandatory requirements for resident and
nonresident persons transferring capital or income or, more
generally, leaving the country. In some cases, compliance with
tax rules is administered by the tax authorities in conjunction
with the emigration authorities, and in other cases, with the
assistance of the exchange control officials. 4
E. Foreign Anti-Money Laundering Offenses
Anti-money laundering law is new and developing quick-
ly.4"5 Governments are taking unprecedented steps to encour-
age countries to enact laws, to assist them in the preliminary
stages of investigations, and to help them modernize their
procedural laws to fulfill the new bilateral and multilateral
treaties. A compilation of a restatement of international money
laundering or a type of international customary anti-money
laundering law would be very useful in providing basic guide-
lines for the development of such legislation in countries
throughout the world. The Financial Action Task Force
("FATF") has set forth forty principles for which participating
countries are audited. The following is a simplified and
abbreviated version of the FATF principles which must be
addressed if a country wishes to enact effective anti-money
laundering legislation.
402. See id. at 40.
403. Id.
404. Id.
405. Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering Report, Recommendation
7, 11 (Paris, Feb. 7, 1990) [hereinafter Financial Action Task Force Report]. See also,
e.g., Council of Europe, Summary Draft Explanatory Report on the Convention on
Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of the Proceeds of Crime, para. 8, July
6, 1990. ACDPC17ADII.90 [Restricted CDPC (90) 17 Addendum II].
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The first principle adopted by the FATF is to criminalize
the offense of money laundering. This principle was derived
from the 1988 U.N. Drug Convention which required nation
states to criminalize money laundering. °" Differing among
countries is the norm of conduct and scienter requirement
needed to criminalize participation in money laundering. Some
countries require the transgressor to understand or at least to
have knowledge of the crime, but some treaties or laws criminal-
ize conduct that is only negligent or careless. °7 Hence, it is
important to study each convention and law, because if a
country requests assistance and this country does not have the
same mens rea standard as the requested state, the obligation to
cooperate and assist may be undermined.
Another principle adopted by the FATF erodes the right to
financial secrecy. A regime whose objective is to combat money
laundering must, by necessity, weaken the right to financial
privacy. Clearly the right to financial privacy is best protected
when a lawyer explicitly protects this right and the legislature
imposes criminal penalties on violators. Several countries,
however, have imposed exceptions to this right to financial
privacy. Attorneys must intrude on financial privacy to under-
stand the business of their clients or a transaction under the
penalty of being responsible to society for the failure to "know
their client" or to recognize "suspicious transactions."408 That
is, if a lawyer or bank does not ask enough questions, they risk
the possibility of committing a crime. This is a very important
change in international law.
A third principle is the requirement to "know your cli-
ent." °" International movement of money is greatly affected
by this requirement to obtain detailed information about clients
and transactions. In the United States and Australia, this
information must be transmitted to the government, which in
turn compares it against information stored in a computer
database which records tax information and potentially suspi-
cious crimes.41 °
406. Financial Action Task Force Report, supra note 405, at 11.
407. Id.
408. Id. at 12.
409. Id. at 18.
410. See gmerally id. at 13.
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Other countries such as Canada and France have more
limited requirements. In these countries, only banks and other
professionals must obtain, and maintain for some years,
information about their clients and certain transactions. If there
is a criminal investigation the banks and professionals must
immediately transmit this information to the government.
Presently, only banks and professionals must do this, but
pressure is being exerted, especially by the United States and
Australia, to require that this information be transmitted
automatically and not just by request of governmental authori-
ties."' In the United States these reports are known as
"Currency Transaction Reports."
412
The governments of Switzerland and Italy have terminated
the right of registered intermediaries, such as attorneys and
accountants, to accept money in the form of deposits from their
clients, without revealing the identification of such clients. The
governments of Switzerland and Italy have very important
financial sectors, and thus they are trying to force other
governments and international organizations to take the same
action so that money does not flow from their country to other
countries with more lenient regulations.
A fourth principle of identifying and reporting suspicious
transactions requires a bank or an attorney to inform the
government if they observe suspicious financial activity."' If
a bank or bank official does not inform the government of the
suspicious transaction, the bank or bank official is criminally
liable.414 The requirement to inform on a client is dangerous
because some governments (such as the United States), in
adopting this requirement, interpret transactions with a
suspicious country, with bank secrecy, or with an offshore trust
411. See generally id.
412. Id. at 16. Divergence of opinion existed within the Task Force on whether
suspicious activity reporting should be mandatory or permissive. Id.; see also Office of
the Comptroller of the Currency, Money Laundering: A Bankers Guide to Avoiding
Problems, at 4, 7 (Dec. 1989).
413. Financial Action Task Force Report, supra note 405, at 19.
414. See generally 54, BNA's Banking Report (BNA) No. 3, at 115 (Jan. 22, 1990)
(discussing the European Economic Community's goals and program for liberalization
and unification of its financial markets); When the Walls Come Tumbling Down; A United
Europe Will Allow Criminals to Move Cash Profits Though Europe More Easily, 34 AM. SOC'Y
FOR INDUSTRY sec., Vol. 1, No. 15, at 13 (Nov. 3, 1989) (discussing the problems facing
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regime, as suspicious simply because these countries themselves
are suspected of being money laundering havens.
It will be important for countries to study and combat the
implementation of the suspicious transaction requirement
because there is danger that the implementation of this law will
harm the jurisdictions that have important financial sectors.
Another principle advocated by the FATF is to improve the
regulation of professionals operating in the financial sector.415
By strictly regulating professionals and entities operating in the
financial sector, governments may effectively deter money
laundering. In many jurisdictions, the owners and operators of
companies, trusts, financial institutions, travel agencies and
other persons who manage money are not strictly regulated.
However, countries with international banking sectors are
beginning to establish regulations for these professionals and
entities in an effort to combat money laundering.
416
The final principle of anti-money laundering law discussed
here is the forfeiture of goods.417 So important has the
principle become that it is itself now considered a sub-
regime-the subregime of international asset forfeiture. These
new anti-money laundering laws contain substantive and
procedural provisions for forfeiting goods. Some laws which
provide for asset forfeiture include only criminal activity, but
other forfeiture laws include civil and administrative actions.4 18
Many countries cooperate with asset forfeiture provisions only
when laws are derived from the penal code. Also, some
countries apply these laws only to the proceeds and instrumen-
talities of drug-related crimes. Other countries have more
comprehensive laws encompassing all crimes.419
415. Financial Action Task Force Report, supra note 405, at 20.
416. Id.
417. United Nations, Economic and Social Council, United Nations Convention
Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, art. 5, U.N. Doc.
E/CONF.82/15 (1988) [hereinafter Vienna U.N. Drug Convention].
418. For an overview of international asset forfeiture law, see Bruce Zagaris &
Elizabeth Kingma, Asset Forfeiture International and Foreign Law On Emerging Regions, 5
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IV. Procedural Aspects of International Criminal Law and
Related Enforcement Mechanisms
To counsel clients and participate effectively in internation-
al criminal law cases requires a detailed knowledge of the
procedural aspects of international criminal law. Procedural
international criminal law involves such matters as jurisdiction;
obtaining evidence; investigating transnational crimes; obtaining
custody of the alleged criminal(s); transferring proceedings and
obtaining recognition ofjudgments; and transferring prisoners.
A. Mutual Assistance Treaties/Letters Rogatory
1. Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties ("MLAT")
The conclusion in 1959 of the Council of Europe's Multilat-
eral European Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal
Matters carved out judicial assistance in criminal matters
conventions as a separate legal instrument. In the 1970s the
United States decided to try to conclude Mutual Assistance in
Criminal Matters Treaties, which is one specific form of a
MLAT.
420
The first MLAT the United States concluded was in 1977
with Switzerland. 42 1  Thereafter, the United States concluded
treaties with eleven other countries with the negotiation process
of additional countries underway.422
The purpose of mutual assistance in criminal matters
treaties is to supplement international law enforcement assis-
tance to police and other enforcement officials. In particular,
their purpose is to serve as a more effective and efficient
substitute for letters rogatory 23 when compulsory process is
420. For a- useful discussion of the history and operation of U.S. MLATs, see
MICHAEL ABBELL & BRUNO A. RISTAU, 3 INTERNATIONALJUDICIAL ASSISTANCE, CRIMINAL-
OBTAINING EVIDENCE, ch. 8 (1990) [hereinafter ABBELL & RISTAU I], on which this
discussion relies in part.
421. Id. at ch. 4 § 12-4-1 at 99; see a/so Treaty Between the United States of America
and the Swiss Confederation on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, May 25, 1973,
U.S.-Switz., T.IAS. No. 8302, [hereinafter U.S.-Switz. MLAT]. The Switzerland-United
States MLAT was signed May 25, 1973, but did not enter into force until January 23,
1977.
422. ABBELL & RISTAU I, supra note 420, at ch. 4, § 12-4-1 at 99-100.
423. Letters rogatory are the medium whereby one country, speaking through one
of its courts, requests another country acting through its own courts, to assist the
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required to obtain evidence, or when specific procedures must
be complied with for the evidence to be admissible at a criminal
trial in the requesting country.4 4  Whenever possible, it is
most efficient for countries to deal directly at the police
level.425 In most instances, MLATs specifically provide that the
treaty countries can provide law enforcement assistance to each
other through other channels.426 MLATs can, and will, be
effectively used once a country decides to make a criminal tax
investigation.
a. Offenses Covered
Most U.S. MLATs provide that a requested country give
assistance despite the fact that the acts for which the requesting
state seeks assistance would not constitute an offense under the
laws of the requested state.4 27 However, the proposed Panama-
U.S. MLAT4 28 requires a combination of dual criminality,
4 29
and elaborates specific offenses covered without a requirement
of dual criminality.4"' The Panama-U.S. MLAT excludes
specific offenses from coverage by the treaty.
For instance, some MLATs, in addition to refusing assis-
tance for "political offenses" and "military offenses," provide for
specific exceptions for offenses such as tax offenses, exchange
control offenses, antitrust offenses, and customs duty offenses.
Some of the treaties, such as the proposed Panama-U.S. MLAT,
nevertheless cover some of these offenses if they relate to illegal
narcotics trafficking.
43 '
administration ofjustice in the former country. Such a request is usually granted by
reason of the comity existing between nations in ordinary peaceful times. Tiedemann
v. The Signe, 37 F. Supp. 819, 820 (E.D. La. 1941); ABBELL & RISTAU I, supra note 420,
at ch. 3, § 12-3-3 at 75 (purporting that letters rogatory fail to meet the needs of U.S.
investigators and prosecutors because they cannot be used before the grand jury stage
of a criminal investigation and a court may not invoke its judicial power unless a
judicial proceeding is pending).
424. ABBELL & RISTAU I, supra note 420, at ch. 4, § 1242 at 100-01.
425. Id.
426. Id.
427. Id. at ch. 4, § 12-4-3 at 102.
428. Treaty on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, n.d., Panama-U.S., [hereinaf-
ter Pan.-U.S. MLAT]. One of the definitions of "offense" is "any conduct punishable
as a crime under the laws of both the Requesting and Requested States." Id.
429. Id. art. 2(1)(a).
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The scope of offenses covered in an MLAT is one of the
areas in which litigation arises. For example, it is a source of
litigation in most international judicial assistance cases.
b. Coverage of Forfeitures and Related Provisions
New MLATs require providing assistance for: (1) the
immobilization and forfeiture of the proceeds of offenses for
which forfeiture may be ordered; (2) the collection of criminal
fines; and (3) the acquisition of restitution to victims of
crimes.432
In the case of issues arising in Panama, the treaty agree-
ment to immobilize and forfeit the proceeds may be important,
since under the treaty agreement the United States shares with
Panama the proceeds of forfeited assets. 3  If Panama or
developing governments are vigilant and careful, these provi-
sions may be a source of substantial revenue that can also help
compensate for any loss of investment in the international
financial sector of host countries. In addition to governments
and defendants, many third parties, including financial institu-
tions and businesses, will be involved.
c. Coverage of Other Civil and Administrative Matters
The Council of Europe MLAT excludes civil and administra-
tive investigations and proceedings unrelated to criminal
investigations and proceedings.43 4  The U.S.-Colombia pro-
posed MLAT covers civil and administrative investigations and
proceedings.4 5 One of the reasons that Colombia was not
able to ratify the treaty was the broad coverage of proceedings.
The United States has not proposed such broad coverage
since.436 However, the trend internationally, such as in the
European Laundering Convention, 437 is to cover civil and
administrative proceedings. The United States advocated such
432. E.g., id. art. 14(2).
433. See id.
434. See ABBELL & RISTAU I, supra note 420, at A-137.
435. Id. at ch. 4 § 12-4-3 at 104. The Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty Between the
United States and the Republic of Colombia has been approved for ratification by the
U.S. Senate, but is not presently in force. Id.
436. Id.
437. Council of Europe: Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure, and Confisca-
tion of the Proceeds from Crime, Nov. 8, 1990, 30 I.L.M. 150.
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coverage since requested states have refused to enforce civil in
rem forfeitures from the United States. The requested states
were not held covered by treaties and they conflicted with due
process requirements for defendants in criminal cases. The
proposed U.S.-Panama MLAT allows a requested state, in its
discretion, to provide assistance to any administrative agency
performing an adjudicatory function in the requesting state
concerning the imposition of civil or administrative sanctions
which is ancillary to other covered matters.438
d. Taking Testimony
U.S. MLATs require a requested country to compel the
appearance of a witness located within its territory before its
judicial authorities for purposes of testifying in connection with
a criminal investigation or proceeding in the requesting
country.
39
Generally, the provisions allow the presence of such persons
as specified in the request during the execution of the re-
quest.' 0  The purpose of such provision is to allow a defen-
dant in a criminal proceeding in the requesting country to
effectively cross-examine a witness, whose testimony in a
requested country is compelled under the applicable treaty.
This means that the defendant and/or defense counsel can be
present and can directly or indirectly interrogate the witness. In
contrast, many civil law countries require that a defense counsel
propose questions to the judicial authority conducting the
examination. The foreign judicial authority will then ask the
questions to the witnesses.
438. Pan.-U.S. MLAT, supra note 428, at art. 2(3)(e). The term "proceeding" is
broadly defined to include criminal trials, including pre-trial motions, any U.S. grand
jury or any preliminary investigation by Panamanian authorities; and any court or
administrative agency in a hearing that could result in an order imposing forfeiture of
fruits or instrumentalities of narcotics trafficking. Id. art. 2(3) (c).
439. See, e.g., id. arts. 1(2) (a) & 9; Treaty on Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters,
Mar. 18, 1985, U.S.-Can., art. 12(1), 24 I.L.M. 1092 [hereinafter Can.-U.S. MLAT];
Treaty on Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters, Dec. 9, 1987, U.S.-Mex., art. 7(1), 27
I.L.M. 443 [hereinafter Mex.-U.S. MLAT].
440. See, e.g., Pan.-U.S. MLAT, supra note 428, at art. 9(4); Can.-U.S. MLAT, supra
note 439, at art. 7(2). But see, Mex.-U.S. MLAT, supra note 439, at art. 13 (person
"invited" to appear in requesting state).
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e. Providing Documents, Records, and Articles of Evidence
MLATs provide for the production of records and informa-
tion in the possession of the government of the requested state.
Such requested state must provide copies of publicly available
government documents, including documents of its judicial
department."'
The requested state also has discretion to provide the
requesting state with copies of records or information in the
possession of a government office or agency, but not publicly
available, to the same extent and under the same conditions as
it would to its own law enforcement authorities. "The [r] eques-
ted [s] tate may in its discretion deny the request entirely or in
part."" 2 In practice, this provision can be critical to efficient
cooperation between states.4 3
In addition to the above-mentioned government documents,
most U.S. MLATs provide for production and authentication of
business records and other non-government documents and the
441. Pan.-U.S. MLAT, supranote 428, at art. 13(1); Can.-U.S. MLAT, supranote 439,
at art. 13; Mex.-U.S. MLAT, supra note 439, at art. 10(1).
MLATs provide for the authentication of government records or information by
the authorities of the requested state. The newer treaties contain a form appended to
the treaty. See, e.g., Pan.-U.S. MLAT, supra note 428, at art. 13(3); Treaty Between the
Government of Kingdom of Thailand and the Government of the United States on
Mutual Criminal Matters, reprinted in ABBELL & RISTAU I, supra note 420, at A-176-78
[hereinafter Thail.-U.S. MLAT]; Treaty Between the United States and the United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland Concerning the Cayman Islands
Relating to Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters, July 3, 1986, 26 I.L.M. 536, at
A-91-93, [hereinafter Cayman Islands-U.S. MLAT].
442. See Pan.-U.S. MLAT, supra note 428, at art. 13(2); cf., Can.-U.S. MLAT, supra
note 439, at A-71 (allowing no requesting state to deny request).
443. The provision may work as follows: An assistant united states attorney (AUSA)
in Miami prosecuting a narcotics or money laundering case sees evidence that either
the defendant or perhaps a witness regularly used a Panamanian bank to launder
funds. The AUSA also may notice in testimony or other evidence (i.e., letters and
affidavits) that such person had a beach house, an apartment building, and several
expensive automobiles in Panama. The AUSA can take several approaches. Most
likely, because the AUSA is extremely busy with the case and does not know anyone in
Panama, he or she does nothing. However, a more enterprising AUSA, may decide to
contact an attorney in the Office of International Affairs. That attorney may tell the
AUSA that the information should be conveyed to the Ministry ofJustice in Panama
for its handling. The Ministry of Justice in Panama may utilize the information to
either criminally prosecute and/or to forfeit the assets, thereby converting assets of
criminals and possibly organized groups into assets of the Panamanian people.
However, in practice, some reciprocity often must be present for states to freely swap
information under the discretionary provision.
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obtaining of witnesses testimony in a requested country. 4
The requested state must compel the appearance of a witness
and his or her production of the requested records, documents,
and other material." 5
Persons ordered to produce matter in a requested country
can raise whatever privileges they may have under the laws of
that country with respect to the production of such matter.
They can also raise such privileges if they are directed to provide
requested authentication and foundation testimony.
f Executing Requests for Searches and Seizures
MLATs obligate a requested state to conduct searches and
seizures on behalf of a requested state if the request has
information to justify such action under the laws of the request-
ed state.4"
These provisions are intended to require a requested state
to conduct a search and seizure only if the information provided
by the requesting state would permit the requested state to
conduct a search and seizure in connection with a violation of
its domestic laws committed within its jurisdiction.
To help ensure the admissibility of the evidence seized,
MLATs require the requested state to provide certificates
relating to the chain of custody of records, documents, and
articles seized, the identity of the objects seized, and the
integrity of their condition. Under the language of the MLATs,
444. See, e.g., Pan.-U.S. MLAT, supra note 428, art. 9(1); Cayman Islands-U.S. MLAT,
supra, note 441, art. 9(3) at A-83; Switz.-U.S. MLAT, supra note 421, at 164.12.
445. See, e.g., Pan.-U.S. MIAT, supra, note 428, art. 9(1); Switz.-U.S. MLAT, supra,
note 421, art 20 at A-164-12. Some treaty states, such as the Netherlands and Italy, do
not have the authority under their domestic laws to order the equivalent of a subpoena
duces tecum for the production of records, documents, and other material. In these
countries the procedures for search and seizure must be used. See, Peter G. Mc-
Gonagle, Serving Subpoenas Abroad Pursuant To The Futures Trading Act of 1986, 10
FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 710, 727 (1987).
Although some of the earlier treaties do not provide for the procedure and
method for authentication of business records located in a requested state, most of the
modern treaties require that such authentication occur pursuant to the use of the
forms appended to the treaties. See, Pan.-U.S. MIAT, supra note 428, art. 9(5).
446. See, Pan.-U.S. MLAT, supra note 428, art. 15(1); Can.-U.S. MLAT, supra note
439, art. 16(1) at A-73; Mex.-U.S. MLAT, supra note 439, art. 12(1) at A-132.
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the certificates will be admissible in evidence in the requesting
state as proof of the truth of the matters contained in them.447
The requested state does not have to provide any item
seized to the requesting state unless the requesting state has
agreed to such terms and conditions as may be required by that
state to protect third party interests in the item to be trans-
ferred.'
g. Transferring Persons in Custody for Testimonial Purpos-
es
MLATs normally allow a defendant in custody to be
transferred to a requested state for purposes of confrontation in
relation to the taking of testimony in that country in accordance
with the provisions of the treaty.'4  The Panama-U.S. MLAT
provides that when the appearance of a person who is in the
territory of the requested state is needed in the requesting state,
the requesting state may require that the requested state invite
the person to appear before the appropriate authority in the
requesting state.45 ° The person will be informed of the kind
and amount of expenses that the requesting state has indicated
will be paid to him and the response of the person will be
447. See, e.g., Pan.-U.S. MLAT, supra note 428, art. 15(2); Can.-U.S. MIAT, supra
note 439, art. 16(2); Mex.-U.S. MLAT, supra note 439, art. 12(2) at A-132. However,
if the objects seized are records or documents, the certification may not meet the
admissibility requirements of 18 U.S.C. § 3505 because the certificates do not state the
manner in which the records or documents were created and maintained. That is, the
certificates do not vouch for the trustworthiness of the contents of the seized
documents, but only to the fact of their seizure, custody, and physical integrity. See 18
U.S.C. § 3505 (1988) and discussion in ABBELL AND RISTAU I, supra note 420, at § 12-4-
4.
448. See, e.g., Pan.-U.S. MLAT, supra note 428, art. 15(3); Can.-U.S. MIAT, supra
note 439, art. 16(4) at A-73. For instance, if the United States requests confiscation of
assets of a trust account because one of the beneficiaries of the account was convicted
of drug trafficking and some of the proceeds thereof were shown to have gone through
the account, Panama, as the requested state, might want to insist on full opportunity
for third parties who have a right to contest the confiscation of the proceeds of the
account. Similarly, if the United States as a requesting state requests substitute or value
forfeiture of an account of a bank because its customer, a deposed high-level army
officer, is alleged to have used the account and there are no longer funds available,
either the bank, the customer, or even creditors may want to contest such a request.
449. See, e.g., Can.-U.S. MLAT, supra note 439, art. 15 at A-72; Mex.-U.S. MILAT,
supra note 439, art. 8 at A-131.
450. Pan.-U.S. MIAT, supra note 428, art. 11.
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communicated promptly to the requesting state." The
person is under no compulsion to accept an invitation by the
requesting state.45
h. Documents That Do Not Require Appearance in
Requesting Country of the Person Served
All U.S. MLATs, including the one with Panama, authorize
the service of a document that does not require the person
served to travel to the requesting country for the purposes of
appearing in a criminal investigation or proceeding.45 The
Panama MLAT states that "[u]nless otherwise agreed, any
request for the service of a document inviting the appearance of
a person before an authority in the [r] equesting [s] tate must be
transmitted at least thirty days prior to the date of the scheduled
appearance."454 The requested state must return as proof of
service a receipt signed by the person served or a declaration
signed by the officer making service, detailing the form and date
of service.4 55
i. Documents Requiring Personal Appearance in the
Requesting State
Some treaties, including the Panama, Cayman Islands, and
Bahamas MLATs, expressly do not "obligate" the requested state
to serve a subpoena.456 Another MLAT prohibits the imposi-
tion of sanctions by the requesting state on a person who does
not comply with a subpoena.457 There are various other
451. Id.
452. Id.
453. See, Pan.-U.S. MLAT, supra note 428, art. 17(1); see also, Can.-U.S. MLAT, supra
note 439, art. 11(1) at A-71; Mex.-U.S. MLAT, supra note 439, art. 14(1) at A-133.
454. Pan.-U.S. MLAT, supra note 428, art. 17(2); cf Can.-U.S. MLAT, supra note
439, art. 11 (2) at A-71 (requiring reasonable time for service).
455. See, Pan.-U.S. MLAT, supra note 428, art. 17(3); see also Can.-U.S. MLAT, supra
note 439, art. 11(4) at A-71 cf., Mex.-U.S. MILAT, supra note 439, art. 14(3) at A-133
(proof of service returned as specified in request).
456. Pan.-U.S. MLAT, supra note 428, art. 17(1); Cayman Island-US MLAT, supra
note 471, art. 13(1) at A-84; Treaty Between the United States and the Commonwealth
of the Bahamas on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, art 17 (1) at A-46, reprinted
in ABBELL & RISTAU I, supra note 420.
457. Treaty on Extradition and Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters,June 7, 1979,
U.S.-Turk. T.IA.S. No. 9891, at art. 31(2) [hereinafter Turk.-U.S. MLAT].
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provisions restricting the power of a requesting state to take
action to compel the personal appearance in its territory.
458
j. Locating and Identifying Persons
MLATs require a requested state to use its best efforts,
under a treaty request, to ascertain the whereabouts of particular
persons thought to be in its territory, and who are required in
connection with the investigation, prosecution or suppression of
an offense in the requesting state.459 The requested state must
communicate as soon as possible the results of its inquiries to
the requesting state.' 6
k. Assisting in Forfeiture Proceedings
Currently, the most dynamic aspect of MLATs is their use
for immobilizing and forfeiting assets. The Panama MLAT
provides that, if a treaty state becomes aware of the fruits or
instrumentalities of offenses located in the other state that may
be forfeitable or otherwise subject to seizure under the laws of
that state related to serious offenses such as narcotics trafficking,
it may inform the other state.4" If that other state has juris-
diction, it must present this information to its authorities for a
determination as to whether any action is appropriate.4 2
"These authorities will issue their decision pursuant to the laws
of their country, and shall, through their Central Authority,
report to the other State on the action taken.""
By concluding an MLAT, Panama becomes eligible to
receive assets forfeited on request from the United States under
U.S. law.
458. See generally ABBELL & RISTAU I, supra note 420, at § 1244, at 105.
459. See, Pan.-U.S. MIAT, supra note 428, art. 16(1); Mex.-U.S. MLAT, supra note
439, art. 13(1) at A-133; cf. Can.-U.S. MLAT, supra note 439, art. 10 at A-71 (stating
competent authorities are to use best efforts to locate and identify persons in request).
460. See, Pan.-U.S. MLAT, supra note 428, art. 16(2); Mex.-U.S. MLAT, supra note
439, at A-133.
461. Pan.-U.S. MLAT, supra note 428, art. 14(1). The Panama MLAT requires the
treaty states to assist each other to the extent allowed by their respective laws and the
MLAT in proceedings relating to the forfeiture of the fruits or instrumentalities of
offenses, restitution to the victims of crime, and the collection of fines imposed as
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l. Safe Conduct of Witnesses Testifying in the U.S.
Except for the Canadian and Mexican treaties, all U.S.
MLATs provide that a person, whose appearance and testimony
in the requesting country is requested under an MLAT, be
granted safe conduct while he is in the requesting state for such
purposes. 4  These provisions are designed to encourage
witnesses who cannot be compelled to travel to the requesting
country, to appear and testify in that country voluntarily. The
Panama MLAT provides that, while the person is in the request-
ing state pursuant to the execution of a request, such person will
not be subject to service of process or prosecution or suit or be
"detained or subjected to any restriction of personal liberty by
reason of any acts which preceded his departure from the
requested state."465
The safe conduct ceases if, ten days after the person
appearing has been notified that his presence is no longer
required, that person being free to leave, has not left the
requesting state; or, having left the requesting state, has
returned.46
m. Other Types of Assistance
The MLATs authorize other types of assistance that are not
expressly provided for in each respective MLAT. 1 7 For exam-
ple, the Panama MLAT states that assistance and procedures in
the MLAT do not prevent either of the treaty states from
granting assistance to the other treaty state pursuant to the
464. See, e.g., Pan.-U.S. MLAT, supra note 428, art. 11; United States-Italian Republic
Treaty on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, signed, Nov. 9, 1982, entered into force,
Nov. 13, 1985, art. 12(1), inABBELL AND RISTAU I, supra note 420, atA-121 [hereinafter,
Italy-U.S. MILAT]; Kingdom of the Netherlands-United States Treaty on Mutual Assis-
tance in Criminal Matters, signed, June 12, 1981, entered into force, Sept. 15, 1983, art.
9(1), inABBELL AND RISTAU I, supra note 446, atA-150 [hereinafter Neth.-U.S. MLAT];
Switz.-U.S. MLAT, supra note 421, art. 27(1) at A-164.15; Turk.-U.S. MLAT, supra note
457, art. 34(1) at A-197.
465. Pan.-U.S. MLAT, supra note 428, art. 12(1).
466. See, e.g., Italy-U.S. MLAT, supranote 464, art. 17(2) atA-121; Neth.-U.S. MLAT,
supra note 464, art. 9(3) at A-150; Pan.-U.S. MIAT, supra note 428, art. 12(2); Switz.-
U.S. MLAT, supra note 421, art. 27(3) at A-164.15; Turk.-U.S. MLAT, supra note 457,
art. 34(3) at A-197.
467. See, e.g., Can.-U.S. MLAT, supra note 439, art. 18 at A-73 (providing that "the
Parties may agree on such practical measures as may be necessary to facilitate the
implementation of this Treaty").
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provisions of other international agreements to which it may be
a party or in accordance with the provisions of its internal
laws.4 s
n. Letters Rogatory
As discussed above, MLATs are useful tools with detailed
provisions to assist in international investigations. Letters
rogatory, on the other hand, are clearly inferior to the proce-
dures of an MLAT. They may not be used prior to the grand
jury stage of a criminal investigation, since a U.S. court can issue
a letter rogatory only if a judicial proceeding is pending before
it.4 9 Further, not all countries will permit the use of letters
rogatory in a grand jury stage.470 In addition, because letters
rogatory are normally not transmitted directly, substantial delays
are often encountered when one uses letters rogatory. For
example, the lack of proper supervision and monitoring of the
transmission and implementation of letters rogatory results in
delays and other problems in the execution of letters rogatory.
Finally, the execution of letters rogatory is discretionary whereas
execution of an MLAT is mandatory as is the method to
implement the request.
4 71
468. Pan.-U.S. MLAT, supra note 428, art. 18(1); see also Mex.-U.S. MLAT, supra note
439, art. 15 at A-133 (with identical provision language).
469. U.S. v. Reagan, 453 F.2d 165, 172-73 (6th Circ. 1971), cert. denied 406 U.S. 946
(1972). In the Reagan case, the court interpreted the law permitting letters rogatory,
28 U.S.C. § 1781. Id. at 172. The question was when the court could issue the
letters--during a grand jury investigation, or after a grand jury indictment? Id. The
court found no pointed precedent, but held that as long as an action is pending before
a tribunal, it is not necessary to wait for a decision of the grand jury. Id. at 173.
470. C. ToddJones, Compulsion Over Comity: The United States'Assault on Foreign Band
Secrecy, 12 NW.J. INT'L L. & Bus. 454, 472 (1992):
... [F]oreign jurisdictions often do not recognize United States
grand jury and administrative procedures as valid bases for letters
rogatory because they do not meet their "judicial proceeding"
requirement for answering a letter rogatory.
Id.
471. For a discussion of a case in which a U.S. court denied a request by the
Brazilian Government for letters rogatory assistance in a criminal tax investigation, see
Bruce Zagaris, U.S. Court of Appeals Overturns Brazilian Letters Rogatory Because Criminal
Proceeding Is Not Imminent Enough, 7 INT'L ENFORCEMENT L. REP. 265 (1991).
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2. Procedure
a. Competent Authority Responsibility
The MLATs provide that a Central Authority in each treaty
state has the responsibility for the administration and implemen-
tation of the MLAT.47 2 For Panama, the Central Authority is
the Minister of Government and Justice or a person designated
by him.4 73  For the U.S. the Central Authority is the Attorney
General or a person designated by her.
4 74
The Attorney General delegates her authority to act as the
Central Authority under the MLATs to the Assistant Attorney
General, Criminal Division.475 In turn, the Assistant Attorney
General has redelegated the authority to the Criminal Division's
Office of International Affairs ("OA).476 The Director of
OIA has the primary responsibility for the administration and
implementation of the MLATs.
The Central Authority has the responsibility to receive and
screen all treaty requests that originate in its territory.4 77
Requests for assistance can be made only by the Central
Authority of the requesting state.4 78  The Central Authority of
the requesting state must directly transmit all requests to the
Central Authority of the requested state. 479  The Central
Authorities must communicate directly with one another with
472. See. e.g., Cayman Islands-U.S. MLAT, supra note 441, art. 2 at A-78; Republic
of Colombia-United States Mutual Assistance Treaty, signed, Aug. 20, 1980, art. 2(1),
reprinted inABBELL AND RISTAU I, supra note 420, at A-100 [hereinafter Col-U.S. MLAT];
Mex.-U.S. MLAT, supra note 439, art. 2 at A-128; Switz.-U.S. MLAT, supra note 421, art.
28(1) at A-164-15; Thail.-U.S. MLAT, supra note 441, art. 3 at A-168.
473. Pan.-U.S. MIAT, supra note 428, art. 4(3).
474. Id. art. 4(2).
475. See 28 C.F.R. S0.64-1 (1994) (stating that a central or competent authority is
delegated power under treaties and executive agreements on mutual assistance in
criminal matters).
476. Department of Justice, Criminal Division Directive No. 81 [reprinted in 28
C.F.R. following C.R. § 0.64-3].
477. ABBELL AND RISTAU I, supra note 420, at 136 (citing Turk.-U.S. MLAT, supra
note 457, art. 28(2) at 197). See also, Can.-U.S. MLAT, supra note 439, art. 1 at A-67;
Italy-U.S. MLAT, supra note 464, art. 2 at A-115; Switz.-U.S. MLAT, supra note 421, art.
28(2) at A-164.15; cf, Mex.-U.S. MLAT, supra note 439, at 128 (cooperation to take
place between "coordinating authorities").
478. ABBELL & RISTAU I, supra note 420, at § 12-4-8, at 136 (citing Thail.-U.S.
MLAT, supra note 471, art. 3(4) at A-168).
479. ABBELL & RISTAU I, supra note 420, at 136-37.
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respect to the treaty implementation."0 The Central Authori-
ties must consult with each other for purposes of improving the
effectiveness of the treaty and dealing with and trying to resolve
any problems that may arise in the implementation of the
treaty.4
8
b. Responsibility to Execute the Requests
MLATs provide expressly for responsibilities of the authori-
ties of the requested country in executing treaty requests. The
Central Authority of the requested country must comply
promptly with the request. 2 If the Central Authority cannot
execute the request itself, it must transmit it promptly to an
appropriate authority in that country for execution. 4" The
appropriate authority or official of the requested state must
represent a request before its court when judicial action is
required to execute the request. 1 4 The Central Authority of
the requested state must return the executed request, together
with all information and evidence obtained, to the Central
Authority of the requesting state.
A Central Authority of the requested state necessarily acts
as an intermediary and must delegate many of the tasks in the
execution of a request. Normally, it will receive requests and
screen them to verify their compliance with the MLAT. The
Central Authority then determines whether they contain
sufficient information to allow them to be executed. If so, they
send them to the appropriate authority in the requested state
for execution. The Central Authority acts as a liaison between
the executing authority and the Central Authority of the
requesting state in obtaining any additional information
required to execute the request and to clarify any issues the
executing authority may have with respect to the substantive and
procedural requirements of the requesting state vis-a-vis the
execution of the request. Finally, the Central Authority receives
the executed requests and information and evidence obtained
from the executing authority. It will then send it to the Central




484. Id. at 136-37.
485. Id. at 137-38.
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Authority of the requesting state for sending to the authority
which initially made the request. 6
c. Form and Contents of a Request
MLATs provide that requests for assistance must be
written." The Panama-U.S. MLAT provides only that requests
must be in writing where compulsory process is required in the
requested state or where otherwise required by the requested
state.' The new MLATs also provide that in urgent circum-
stances an oral request can be made, but they must be followed
by a written request."
MLATs provide the elements that must be included in a
treaty request, as well as those which should be included to
enable its execution and allow the evidence obtained to be
introduced in evidence in a criminal trial in the requesting
state.4' MLATs also have requirements regarding the lan-
486. For example, if the United States is the requesting state, this may be a state
attorney general or perhaps an assistant U.S. Attorney.
487. See, e.g., Can.-U.S. MLAT, supra note 439, art. 6(2) atA-69; Cayman Islands-U.S.
MLAT, supra note 441, art. 4(1) at A-79; Mex.-U.S. MLAT, supra note 439, art. 4(1) at
A-129.
488. Pan.-U.S. MLAT, supra note 428, art. 5(1).
489. See, e.g., id.; Italy-U.S. MLAT, supra note 464, art. 3 at A-i 16; Switz.-U.S. MLAT,
supra note 421, art. 29 at A-164.16.
490. See, e.g., MLATs noted supra note 519.
As a representative treaty, the Panama-United States MLAT requires a request:
(a) to name the agency or law enforcement authority
conducting the proceeding to which the request
relates;
(b) to specify the subject matter and nature of the proceeding
for the purposes of which the request is made and in
particular the criminal offense for the investigation,
prosecution or suppression of which the assistance is
required and a summary of the facts which form the basis
thereof;
(c) to provide a description of the evidence or information
sought or the acts of assistance to be performed where
possible, the time period to which any such evidence or
information relates;
(d) to give the purpose for which the evidence, information, or
other assistance is sought; and
(e) to indicate any time limit within which compliance with the
request is wanted, stating reasons.
3. To the extent necessary and possible a request shall also include
(a) available information on the identity and whereabouts of a
person to be located;
(b) the identity and location of a person to be served, that
person's relationship to the proceedings, and the
manner in which service is to be made;
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guage of requests, 49' the return of documents and articles,49 2
and costs.
4 9 3
(c) the identity and location of persons from whom evidence
is sought.
Pan.-U.S. MLAT, supra note 428, art. 5(2)(3).
Other MLATs provide that the requesting state must provide a list of questions
to be answered, the form in which documents and evidence should be produced and
authenticated, a description of documents and articles to be produced, and information
concerning persons likely to be affected by the request (but who are not the subject of
the investigation or prosecution). See, e.g., Switz.-U.S. MLAT, supra note 421, art. 29(2)
at A-164.16; Italy-U.S. MLAT, supra note 464, art. 3(2) at A-i 16.
491. MLATs provide that if the two treaty states do not speak the same language,
a request must be translated into, or submitted in, the language of the requested state.
Most MLATs also require documents accompanying requests to be translated into the
language of the requested state. See, e.g., Mex.-U.S. MLAT, supra note 439, art. 4(1) at
A-129; Thail.-U.S. MIAT, supra note 471, art. 4(1) at A-168-69.
492. See MLATs noted supra note 519. MLATs provide that the requesting state
must return the documents, records, and articles transmitted to the requesting state in
executing a treaty request. Most MLATs specify that such material must be returned
to the requested state as soon as possible unless the requested state waives their return.
493. See, e.g., MLATs noted supra note 519. MLATs state that the costs of executing
treaty requests be allocated. Much difference exists among the treaties concerning
which country should bear the costs of execution. All MLATs provide that the
requesting state is responsible for the costs of: (1) transferring and returning persons
in custody; (2) the travel and subsistence expenses of witnesses who appear in a
proceeding in the requesting state pursuant to a treaty request; and (3) the fees of
expert witnesses who testify in either the requesting or requested state. See, e.g., Pan.-
U.S. MLAT, supra note 428, at. 7(1).
The Panama-U.S. MLAT provides that the requested state must bear all ordinary
expenses of executing a request within its boundaries, except certain costs that the
requesting state must meet. See, e.g., Pan.-U.S. MLAT, supra note 428, art. 7(2). Article
7(2) of the Panama-U.S. MLAT requires the requesting state to pay for costs associated
with the following: (1) expert fees; (2) translations and transcriptions; (3) travel and
incidental expenses of persons traveling to the requested states to attend the execution
of a request; (4) reasonable costs associated with the location reproduction and
transportation of requested documents or records to the Central Authority of the
requesting state; and (5) the costs of stenographic reports requested by the requesting
state. Id.
The Panama-U.S. MLAT and other MLATs provide that if during the execution
of the request, it becomes apparent that expenses of an extraordinary nature are
required to fulfill the request, the parties must consult to determine the terms and
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B. Extradition
Extradition is the international rendition of fugitives wanted
for trial on an extraditable offense, or sought for punishment
after they have been convicted.494
Most states have a "mixed" extradition system in which both
the executive and judiciary play a role, although there exist
various models and systems.495
In the United States, while the executive branch negotiates
extradition treaties, the judiciary decides issues of treaty
existence or coverage. Judicial interpretations of treaty provi-
sions and their applicability to specific situations give great
deference to executive branch authority and expertise.
496
U.S. law authorizes the Secretary of State to extradite
persons.497 When the United States is the requested state, the
Secretary of State has authority to surrender the fugitive to the
requesting state only after the fugitive has been found extradit-
able by ajudicial officer of the United States following a proper
extradition hearing.49 However, the Secretary of State has
discretion not to surrender the fugitive even when the judiciary
has ordered the extradition.499
While common law countries traditionally have based
extradition on bilateral treaties, civil law countries have based
extradition on comity and reciprocity, combined with national
legislation and a multilateral approach. Civil law countries
permit extradition in the absence of any treaty on the basis of
national extradition laws that require reciprocity.500
494. See CHRISTOPHER L. BLAKESLEY, International Extradition for Business Crimes, in
INTERNATIONAL TRADE: AVOIDING CRIMINAL RISKS, 17-1, 17-4 (1991).
495. Id. at 17.4 (containing a discussion and references to the different types of
models).
496. See id. at 17-5; see also United States v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 299 U.S. 304
(1936); Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920).
497. 18 U.S.C. § 3186 (1988); see also Escobedo v. United States, 623 F.2d 1098,
1105 n.20 (5th Cir. 1980) (holding that the Secretary of State always has discretion to
refuse to extradite, even if magistrate concludes that fugitive is extraditable), cert. denied,
449 U.S. 1036 (1980).
498. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3185, 3186 (1988). The extradition hearing is provided for in 18
U.S.C. § 3184 (1988).
499. Id. § 3184 (1988); Escobedo, 623 F.2d at 1105 n.20.
500. See generally ETHAN A. NADELMANN, COPS ACROSS BORDERS: THE INTERNA-
TIONAUZATION OF U.S. CRIMINAL LAW ENFORCEMENT, 398-403 (1993) (addressing the
differences among nations in the enforcement of criminal laws).
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In the United States, extradition is a federal power that, by
law, requires a treaty."' Under U.S. law, extradition treaties
are generally self-executing and require no implementing
legislation. 50 2  Nevertheless, applicable extradition law does
not permit extradition from the United States in the absence of
a treaty.
505
Even if a fugitive goes to a country which is not one of the
more than 100 countries with which the United States has an
extradition treaty, the United States will often seek extradition
as a matter of comity even if it is not possible for the United
States to extradite a person in the absence of a treaty.
50 4
Notwithstanding the lack of reciprocity, positive responses by
foreign governments to extradition requests made in this
manner are not uncommon as a matter of comity or on the
basis of that country's municipal extradition law.
Although most countries do not extradite their own
nationals, the United States traditionally has extradited its
nationals.05  Provided that the extradition treaty allows a
nation the discretion to extradite nationals, the United States
will do so, even though the country seeking extradition might
not be able or willing to reciprocate. The United States will also
extradite nationals even though the requesting country may not
have the same system of constitutional protections afforded to
the criminal defendant bound over for trial before the United
States courts.
An accused fugitive in the United States is entitled to an
evidentiary hearing which includes a specific numeration of each
charge and how it satisfies the treaty requirements.
50 6
501. Factor v. Laubenheimer, 290 U.S. 276, 287 (1933) (citing United States v.
Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407 (1886)); see aLso Ivancevic v. Artukovic, 211 F.2d 565, 566 (9th
Cir. 1954). The principles of international law recognize no right to extradition apart
from a treaty. However, a government may voluntarily exercise the power to surrender
a fugitive from justice to a the country from which he has fled and it is generally under
a moral duty to do so. Factor, 290 U.S. at 287.
502. 18 U.S.C. § 3181 (1993).
503. Id.
504. See Pan.-U.S. MLAT, supra note 428, art. 17(2).
505. See generally In re Extradition of Burt, 737 F.2d 1477 (7th Cir. 1984) (holding
that extradition of a nation's own nationals is often done, and the United States has
such authority).
506. Caplan v. Vokes, 649 F.2d 1336, 1344 (9th Cir. 1981).
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A fugitive in the United States has various procedural rights,
such as the right to counsel. °7 Extradition is allowed only on
evidence showing probable cause to believe that the fugitive
committed the alleged extraditable offense. The fugitive must
be permitted "discovery" to enable him to "explain" his position
relating to the charges against him. 8
The United States grants extradition only after a showing of
probable cause to believe that the fugitive committed the crime
charged. The European and civil law countries generally permit
extradition upon a showing of only two elements of evidence:
(1) a properly authenticated arrest warrant or other similar
document, in the case of a person charged with having commit-
ted an extraditable offense, or the official document or judg-
ment and sentence of the convicted fugitive; and (2) evidence
that the accused person standing before the court is the person
identified in the extradition documents. 0 9 The European
judge essentially verifies the formal regularity of the extradition
request and normally does not consider the sufficiency of the
evidence or the foundation of the complaints against the
accused.510
1. Defenses to Extradition
A number of defenses and exceptions exist to avoid
extradition.
Extradition treaties generally provide the extradition of
persons who have been charged with or convicted of any of the
crimes or offenses specified in the treaty as being extraditable,
if committed within the jurisdiction of one of the contracting
parties. Although five different bases for jurisdiction exist in
United States criminal cases, United States courts and commen-
tators traditionally interpretjurisdiction in extradition treaties as
only territorial.
507. Wirth v. Surles, 562 F.2d 319, 322 (4th Cir. 1977) (holding that a fugitive is
entitled to a hearing before a magistrate who must inform him of the demand made
for his extradition, that he has a right to counsel, and that he has a right to test the
legality of his arrest).
508. Quinn v. Robinson, 783 F.2d 776, 815 (9th Cir.) (abuse of discretion not to
allow discovery), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 882 (1986).
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When the requested and requesting states'jurisdictional law
differ, a defendant may have a defense based on the "special use
of double criminality." Under this doctrine, extradition must be
denied if the offense for which extradition is sought would not
be considered by the law of the requested state to be within its
jurisdiction under similar, but obverse, circumstances.51'
It is not uncommon for United States courts to sanction the
assertion of jurisdiction over an offense consummated outside
United States territory, either when a constituent element of that
offense has occurred within United States territory or when the
offense causes harmful effects or results within that territory.
A basic defense to extradition is that the offense charged is
not extraditable by the relevant treaty. For instance, pre-World
War II extradition treaties generally did not cover crimes such
as mail fraud and wire fraud or securities law violations.
However, recent treaties have broader coverage." 2
Extradition treaties usually incorporate one of two methods
for delimiting extraditable offenses: the enumerative and the
"no-list" methods. Traditionally, the United States and most
common law countries have enumerated an exclusive list of
offenses that are extraditable. Generally, the treaties of
European countries and many recent United States treaties have
used a "no-list" approach and incorporated a clause providing
that a certain minimum standard of punishability under the laws
of both states will render an offense extraditable.513
Until 1979, all the United States bilateral extradition treaties
used the enumerative method.514 The United States' refusal
to utilize the no-list approach resulted from a belief that such an
approach would be to unwieldy in light of the various criminal
justice systems in the United States.515
511. Blakesley, supra note 494, § 17.05. The double criminality principle is that the
offense charged must be an offense in both the requesting state as well as in the
requested state. Id.
512. See, e.g., Switzerland-United States Memorandum of Understanding to Improve
Law Enforcement In Insider Trading, Aug. 31, 1982, 22 I.L.M. 1. U.S. - Bahamas S.
Treaty Doc. No. 17, 102nd Cong. (allowing wire and mail fraud as an offense).
513. Blakesley, supra note 494, at § 17.05.
514. Sharon A. Williams, The Double Criminality Rule and Extradition: A Comparative
Analysis, 15 NOVA L. REV. 581, 599-600 (1991).
515. Id. at 600. A variety of approaches exist in the various U.S. extradition treaties,
and specific treaties should be reviewed carefully in a given case. For instance, many
treaties do not allow extradition for RICO violations and for many newer financial
crimes, such as money laundering and insider trading.
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The principle of double criminality is based on the legal
maxim nulla poena sine lege and precludes extradition unless the
conduct is considered a crime under the domestic law of both
countries.1 6
The double criminality rule is satisfied if the requesting
state submits: (1) evidentiary documentation of the crime; and
(2) an affidavit of relevant law (including the statute that makes
the action in question criminal). To refute the claim, defense
counsel should: (1) review the law of the requested state or find
an expert who knows it; and (2) develop a strategy so that the
reviewing court will listen to and understand the differences in
foreign, criminal law. 17
A dispute sometimes develops over whether the determina-
tion of double criminality is controlled by the "denomination"
of the offense in each state's law or by the underlying con-
duct.
518
Under the principle of specialty, a fugitive returned by way
of extradition may be tried only for the offenses for which he
was extradited."' This principle requires a correspondence
between the charges contained in the indictment and the facts
presented to the extraditing magistrate. The fugitive must be
516. Williams, supra note 514, at 582 states:
The basic precept of extradition law, contained in many countries'
extradition statutes and bilateral treaties, is that there must be a
threshold requirement of double criminality, otherwise known as
duality of offenses. Under this doctrine, the offense for which
extradition is sought must be one for which the requested state
would in turn be able to demand extradition. In other words, the
offense must be considered criminal in both states. Double
criminality is based upon a reciprocal characterization of the
offenses and a type of mutuality of obligations between states. It is
also premised upon the maxim nuUa poena sine lege, or "no punish-
ment without law." As one author succinctly stated: "No person may
be extradited whose deed is not a crime according to the criminal
law of the State which is asked to extradite as well as the state which
demands extradition."
Id. (footnotes omitted).
517. Blakesley, supra note 494, at § 17.05.
518. Id.
519. See United States v. Herbage, 850 F.2d 1463, 1465 (11th Cir. 1988) ("[t]his
principle stands for the proposition that the requesting state, which secures the
surrender of a person, can prosecute that person only for the offense for which he or
she was surrendered by the requested state or else must allow that person an
opportunity to leave the prosecuting state to which he or she had been surrendered.").
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released from custody and permitted to leave the country,
before he may be tried for other offenses.
5 20
Continental countries have applied the rule of specialty to
voluntary return as well as to the more common extradition.
However, United States courts have not applied the rule of
specialty when the fugitive has either waived extradition or been
deported.2 1 Where the fugitive is handed over as a matter of
comity, the rule of specialty has been applied by United States
courts.5 2 2
A split of authority exists over the issue of whether a
returned fugitive has standing to raise the principle of specialty
or whether only the requested state can raise it. Whereas the
classical view holds that persons are only objects of treaties and
cannot assert the right, the modern view posits that persons are
the subjects of treaties and as such have the right to assert the
principle of specialty.
5 23
520. United States v. Sensi, 879 F.2d 888, 894-95 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
521. United States v. Ditommaso, 817 F.2d 201, 212 (2d Cir. 1987) (holding that
when the accused is within the court's jurisdiction, such court should not consider the
scope of the charges unless the Department of State or the deporting country suggests
the defendant can or should be tried in the United States only for specified offenses);
United States v. Molina-Chacon, 627 F. Supp. 1253, 1264 (E.D.N.Y. 1986) (establishing
that a superseding indictment did not violate the doctrine of specialty even though it
contained additional counts and a broader conspiracy than that for which the
defendant consented to be returned to the United States; for the doctrine of specialty
is a privilege of the asylum state and not the individual right of one accused of a crime,
and there was no evidence that asylum state had any objection to the indictment), aft'd,
817 F.2d 201 (2d Cir. 1987).
522. United States v. Evans, 667 F.Supp. 974, 979 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (finding that
specialty doctrine applies when extradition obtained through acts of comity by the
surrendering government instead of by treaty); Fiocconi v. Attorney Gen. of the United
States, 339 F.Supp. 1242 (S.D.N.Y. (1972)), affd, 462 F.2d 475 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 1059 (1972).
523. See, e.g., U.S. v. Puentes, 50 F.3d 1567, 1574 (11 th Cir. 1995) (holding that an
individual extradited pursuant to an extradition treaty has standing under doctrine of
specialty to raise any objections which the requested nation might have asserted).
However, the extradited individual enjoys this right at the sufferance of the requested
nation. Id. If the requested nation waives its fight to object to a treaty violation, the
defendant loses standing to object to such an action. See United States v. Riviere, 924
F.2d 1289, 1300-01 (3d Cir. 1991); United States v. Najohn, 785 F.2d 1420, 1422 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1009 (1986). Note that the requested state's waiver of a
treaty provision may occur either contemporaneously with the extradition or after the
defendant has been surrendered to the requesting state. Puents, 50 F.3d at 1575 n. 5.
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Extradition treaties have "exceptions" from extradition.
The law of the requested state determines whether or not any of
the exceptions will apply.
524
2. Procedural Issues
The accused in an extradition hearing both in civil law
countries and the United States has no absolute right to bail or
provisional liberty. However, bail may be permitted if the court
finds "special circumstances" to justify it.
525
Extradition agreements are applied retroactively, without
violating the principle of nulla poena sine leg 5 21 or traditional
protections against ex post facto laws. However, extradition
treaties differ on their treatment of the effective date and should
be consulted.
United States case law permits a court to exercise jurisdic-
tion even if the fugitive has been brought to the court by means
of irregular rendition (e.g., expulsion, deportation, and
exclusion-all means that normally provide procedural short-
cuts to extradition procedure) or even kidnapping. Only if the
abduction involves egregious conduct violating the person's
bodily and psychological integrity will the courts not find
jurisdiction.
524. Examples of "exceptions" are as follows:
1. When the person whose surrender is sought is currently being proceeded
against or has been tried and acquitted or punished in the territory of the requested
party or in a third state for the acts for which his extradition is requested (e.g., double
jeopardy), see M. CHERIF BASSiOUNI, The United States Mode in 2 INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL LAw 413-17 (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 1986);
2. When the person sought, according to the law of either the requesting or the
requested party, has become immune from the prosecution or punishment by reason
of lapse of time (i.e., a statute of limitations), id.;
3. The offense is a tax-related or other "fiscal" violation; id.; or
4. The offense for which the individual's extradition is requested is of a political
character or the requisition for his surrender has, in fact, been made with a view to try
or punish him for an offense of a political character. See NADELMAN, supra note 501,
at 419.
525. Salerno v. United States, 878 F.2d 317, 317 (9th Cir. 1989) (citations omitted).
Special circumstances include "the raising of substantial claims upon which the
appellant has a high probability of success, a serious deterioration of health while
incarcerated, and unusual delay in the appeal process." Id.
526. United States v. Ragen, 150 F.2d 190, 192 (7th Cir. 1945); Matter of
Extradition of McMullen, 769 F. Supp. 1278, 1291 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
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C. Prisoner Transfer Treaties
In 1976, the United States concluded a prisoner transfer
treaty with Mexico. Since then, the United States has negotiated
and signed similar bilateral prisoner transfer treaties with seven
other countries,527 and a multilateral treaty with the Council
of Europe.528  The treaties in some cases allow convicted
persons who are imprisoned in a foreign country and want to
serve their sentence in their home country to apply for a
transfer, so that they can serve the remainder of their sentence
in their home country.
29
The purposes of such treaties are to alleviate problems
associated with the rapidly growing number of foreign nationals
being convicted in their courts. Such a large number of foreign
persons presents substantial administrative problems to the
corrections authorities of sentencing countries and is compara-
tively costly. Humane and rehabilitation reasons also motivate
transfers.3 0
V. Conclusion
As demonstrated by the discussions of the selected areas of
international white collar crime, U. S. practitioners increasingly
need to understand and apply on a regular basis both the
substantive and procedural aspects of international commercial
criminal law. Globalization and the growth of information
technology will accelerate the growth of law and regulations in
international white collar crime law.
53'
Examples of areas not mentioned in this article are those
coming from public international law, such as the Chemical
527. MICHAEL ABBELL & BRUNO A. RISTAU, 6 INTERNATIONAL JUDICIAL ASSISTANCE,
CRIMINAL PRISONER EVIDENCE § 14-1-1 n. 3, (1990) (referencing treaties with Bolivia,
Canada, Panama, Turkey, Peru, France, and Thailand).
] 528. ABBELL & RISTAU I, supra note 420, at 4 n.4 (citing treaty and ratification by
22 countries).
529. Id.
530. For background on such treaties under U.S. law, see ABBELL AND RiSTAU I,
supra note 420
531. For more on the impact of information technology on international money
laundering see, Bruce Zagaris and Scott B. MacDonald, Money Laundering, Financial
Fraud, and Technology: The Perils of an Instantaneous Economy, 26 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L
& ECON. 61 (1992).
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Weapons Convention"3 2 and the efforts to prevent the spread
of nuclear weapons and their components.
An enormous growth area already in process is the develop-
ment of international commercial criminal law due to economic
integration. Examples mentioned in this discussion are the
result of the E.U.'s influence in the development of insider
trading legislation. With the achievement of the single Econom-
ic Market and institution of the Maastricht Agreement, the E.U.
has begun assuming direct responsibility for criminal justice."'
The E.U. is developing laws in the areas of anti-money launder-
ing, securities trading, and customs. 5 4 Just as important it has
established the Europol whose tasks include: facilitating
exchange of information among E.U. members; collecting,
collating and analyzing information and intelligence; supporting
national investigations by forwarding all relevant information to
the national units; and maintaining computerized collections of
information containing data.153  The Schengen Information
System has been created among nine countries for the purpose
of exchanging information on certain crimes such as illegal
migration, terrorism, organized crime, and drug trafficking.
53 6
Similarly in the Western Hemisphere, in the context of
NAIFTA, criminal provisions and procedure for dealing with
intellectual property protection537 and customs538 are con-
532. The Bureau of Export Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce, has
estimated that approximately 6,000 U.S. facilities are involved in activities that could
subject them to CWC monitoring by international inspectors chemical weapons
convention implementation regulations. 59 Fed. Reg. 66291; see also U.S. Agency
Announces Preparation of Regulations to Implement Chemical Weapons Treaty, 11 INT'L
ENFORCEMENT L. REP. 67 (Feb. 1995); US. Industy Has Obligation under New Convention,
11 INT'L ENFORCEMENT L. REP. 39 (Jan. 1995).
533. See, e.g., Malcolm Anderson, The Agenda for Police Cooperation, in POLICING
ACROSS NATIONAL BOUNDARIES (Malcolm Anderson & Monica Den Boer eds., 1994).
534. See European Parliament Proposes Initiatives against International Economic Crime, II
INT'L ENFORCEMENT L. REP. 62 (Feb. 1995).
535. For background on Europol and its goals and functions, see Andr6 Klip,
European Union: Draft Convention on the Establishment of a European Police Office (Europol),
11 INTERNATIONAL ENFORCEMENT LAW REP. 64 (Feb. 1995).
536. For background on the Schengen Convention, see H. MEIJERS ET AL.,
SCHENGEN INTERNALIZATION OF CENTRAL CHAPTERS OF THE LAW ON ALIENS, REFUGEES,
PRIVACY, SECURITY AND THE POLICE (1992).
537. North American Free Trade Agreement, Sept. 14, 1993, art. 1701-19, Pub. L.
No. 103-182, (codified as 19 U.S.C. § 3314).
538. Id. at art. 508; 19 U.S.C. § 3314, art. 508. Concerning penalties Sec. 522 of the
NAFTA implementing law amends Sec. 6103(1) of the Internal Revenue Code allows
the IRS, on written request from the Commission of the U.S. Customs Service, to
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tained within the text of NAFTA. During the negotiation of
NAFTA, measures were taken to strengthen environmental
enforcement cooperation and promises were made and imple-
mented which allows Mexico to strengthen its ability to prose-
cute Americans alleged to have committed violent crimes in the
United States.539 As a result of the criticisms during the
hearings on the ratification of NAFTA in the United States, anti-
money laundering measures have been implemented in both
Mexico and the United States.5 °
A growing area that counsel dealing with international
commercial crime developments must understand and manage
is the roles of both international governmental organizations
("IGOs") and non-governmental organizations ("NGOs"). IGOs,
such as the Economic Summit, Financial Action Task Force,541
and more traditional IGOs such as the E.U., Council of Europe,
and Interpol all play important roles. Counsel must understand
the IGO's operations and be able to cooperate with them to
successfully manage international criminal investigations.
NGOs, such as the International Maritime Bureau and its
fraud bureau,5 42 the Inter-American Federation of Bank
Associations, the International Bar Association ("IBA") ,5  and
their national counterparts all provide information, education
and training, and sometimes take positions and try to influence
the international criminal policy of IGOs and governments.
disclose to Customs officers return information with respect to its authority to conduct
audits under 19 U.S.C. § 1509, or "other actions to recover any loss of revenue, or
collect duties, taxes, and fees, determined to be due and owning pursuant to such
audits."
539. See, e.g., NAFTA Debate Raises International Criminal Cooperation Issues, 9 INT'L
ENFORCEMENT L. REP. 404 (Oct. 1993) Rep. E. Clay Shaw threatened to hold up
NAFTA ratification if the United States did not persuade Mexico to extradite a Mexican
accused of kidnapping and raping the 4-year old niece of the congressman's secretary.
Id. at 404-05.
540. See id. at 405.
541. See supra section III.D.
542. See, e.g., ICC International Maritime Bureua Exposes Nigerian Fraud, 11 INT'L
ENFORCEMENT L. REP. 58 (Feb. 1994). The Bureau has published a special report
entitled NIGERIA: TRADERS AT RISK written by BAM. Ajibade, a Nigerian lawyer, that
traces the various schemes employed and proposes remedies to obtain recompense and
prevent future incidences of fraud. Id.
543. The IBA has had two three-day programs called "Defending the Alleged
Transnational Criminal." One program took place in Munich in 1991 and the other
in Madrid in 1993.
[Vol. 21
88
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 21, Iss. 3 [2014], Art. 20
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol21/iss3/20
AVOIDING CRIMINAL LIABILITY
Counsel can establish links with NGOs in order to participate in
their work.
Bar associations, such as the American Bar Association 544
and the American Society of International Law,'1 increasingly
have groups that regularly follow international white collar
crime developments. Attorneys can benefit significantly from
participating in such groups. These groups also regularly have
programs and videos that provide the latest information on
international white collar crime law.
Law schools increasingly offer courses and seminars on
international criminal law and even international white collar
crime. 4  International law society and student bar groups
frequently hold programs on international criminal law,
including white collar subjects.
Non-legal groups, such as persons concerned with diploma-
cy, international affairs, international business policy, national
security,"' and the interaction of military and other alterna-
tives to the resolution of disputes, are participating in the studies
and policy-making on international white collar crime. For
instance, studies have illustrated increasing links among
organized crime groups who operate crime rackets as a busi-
ness."4 Similarly, studies have shown that police operating
overseas also increasingly operate like a multinational enterprise
and are emulating techniques brought by United States law
enforcement officials.549 Hence the interaction of law and
non-legal disciplines are important in the study and practice of
international white collar crime.
544. The ABA's Criminal Justice and Section of International Law both have
Committees on International Criminal Law.
545. The ASIL has an international criminal interest group and many other interest
groups that deal at least tangentially with international criminal law.
546. For a survey of the current U.S. courses on international criminal law and the
materials used in these courses, see Michael Scharf, Report of the ABA Task Force on
Teaching International Criminal Law, 5 CRIM. L.F. 91, 91-104 (1994).
547. See, e.g., NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION CENTER, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZED
CRIME: EMERGING THREAT TO U.S. SECuRITY (Aug. 1993); U.S. Congress Hears Suggestions
to Counteract New Threats to U.S. National Security from International Organized Crime, 9
INT'L ENFORCEMENT L. REP. 495 (Dec. 1993); GRAY AREA PHENOMENA: CONFRONTING
THE NEW WORLD DISORDER (Max G. Manwaring ed. 1993).
548. See, e.g., Center for Strategic & Int'l Studies, The Transnational Drug Challenge
and the New World Order (Jan. 1993) (concluding that the international drug trade has
evolved into a complex, sophisticated transnational commercial industry).
549. NADELMANN, supra note 501, at 1-4.
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As the discussions in this article show, both the substantive
and procedural areas of international white collar criminal law
are still emerging and dynamic. They provide fruitful areas for
study and practice.
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